[anon84873628]

>Physicalism implies that things we wouldn't intuitively think of as conscious can perfectly mimic all such effects.

This is the multiple relizability argument and it only discounts certain types of physicalism that aren't popular anymore.

I consider myself a physicalism and answer that the simulation of John is conscious.

[nearbuy]

That's the normal physicalist position as far as I'm aware. Is there a physicalist theory where the simulation isn't conscious?

I was replying to a commenter who doubted that a non-conscious entity could mimic a person accurately. I'm pointing out the implication that without p-zombies, just by writing a bunch of stuff on paper, you created a conscious being. I'm not arguing that's false; just that intuitively it's a tough pill to swallow and if you don't want to accept that, p-zombies are the alternative.