| > If the alliance was just to buy time for Red Army, then it would not make sense for Red Army to spend time massacring the elites and armies of conquered states The USSR did not have to expend much effort in taking eastern Poland. It moved in after the Polish army had been largely defeated by the Germans in the West. The USSR's actions here were opportunistic. > This narative, which I started hearing after the start of last Russian war This "narrative" has been around for many decades, and is not particularly controversial. Even at the time, the fact that the USSR and Germany signed a pact at all stunned the world, because they were arch enemies. It was not a marriage of love, and calling it an "alliance" is a major stretch. It was an opportunistic move by two enemies that each had their reasons to temporarily put off their conflict. The Red Army was in turmoil because of the purges and Stalin was deathly afraid of a German attack. The Germans wanted time to go after Poland and the western powers. A central tenet of Nazism was its hatred for Bolshevism (and that was tightly connected to the Nazis' antisemitism as well). Hitler had openly stated his goal of destroying the Soviet Union, and it was clear that any pact could not last. |
The poster above wasn't referring to the effort expended in "taking" eastern Poland militarily -- but in subjugating the population and massacring the elites. This was not an accidental byproduct of the invasion; it was part of its intent. Along with the extremely rapid and violent annexation of the Baltic states in the same period.
It wasn't like Soviet troops wandered in these countries, and didn't know what else to do with the local population. The Bolsheviks were against the independence of all 4 of these countries after the end of WW I, and in the years 1919-1920 tried and failed to conquer each of them. Each attempt was swiftly (enough) repulsed, providing the Bolshevik regime with the first of its many deeply embarrassing setbacks.
The main trigger for the M-R pact was of course the question of how to deal the Germans. But judging by how the Soviets focused their energy and attention in these countries 1939-1941, and its relations with them in the interwar years -- it wasn't their only motivation.
Two birds, one stone.