[raindeer2]

Indeed. The problem is that the word "free" has different meanings when talking about free will and freedom in other contexts. What you talk about is value freedom, while ppl denying the existence of free will refer to "physcial" freedom. Few ppl notice the distinction though which makes the debate somewhat strange.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.08435

[teew]

One thing that's really strange about this article is that it presents compatibilism and incompatibilism as having a different concept of 'free will' – compatibilism sporting an everyday sense of free and incompatibilism roughly a more scientific one. The article assumes incompatibilism to be correct on those grounds and goes from there. Coming from the philosophical literature, this is simply not the case. If both sides assume the same definition of free will, e.g. as "the agent could have chosen differently", they still have a genuine disagreement...

[raindeer2]

Well there are many versions of compatibilism I guess, but just reading the Wikipedia article on compatibilism I don't think most compatibilists think freedom relies on whether or not causal determinism holds. Please tell me if i'm wrong.

Defining free will: Compatibilists often define an instance of "free will" as one in which the agent had the freedom to act according to their own motivation. That is, the agent was not coerced or restrained. Arthur Schopenhauer famously said: "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills."[14] In other words, although an agent may often be free to act according to a motive, the nature of that motive is determined. This definition of free will does not rely on the truth or falsity of causal determinism.[2] This view also makes free will close to autonomy, the ability to live according to one's own rules, as opposed to being submitted to external domination. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

[teew]

> don't think most compatibilists think freedom relies on whether or not causal determinism holds

I guess it is technically true that they would be okay if it turned out determinism was false, since their argument is that determinism and free will CAN be true at the same time. Their line of argument is only really worthwhilein the first place if you believe it plausible that causal determinism holds. And I think most of them do (maybe it's telling that the position is also sometimes called 'soft determinism'). If they denied determinism from the outset, they'd probably be in the 'libertarianist' camp instead (not to be confused with political libertarianism).

The 'tree' of positions relating to determinism & free will is roughly: Do you believe determinism and free will to be mutually exclusive? If no: you're a compatibilist. If yes: you're an incompatibilist. -> In which case: do you believe determinism to be true OR do you believe free will to exist? You believe determinism is true: you are skeptical about free will, to you free will is an illusion. You believe free will to exist: You're a libertarianist and believe complete determinism not to be true.

Although often much lengthier and more technical than Wikipedia, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has very well-vetted entries on philosophical topics, where the authors all are scholars in the respective topic and are asked to write introductory entries (potential downsides: English only and not always completely novice-friendly). There is one on compatibilism, too https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

[raindeer2]

Yes, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is great! (and it is referenced in the paper)

A quote from it: "Other compatibilists show less concern in rebutting the conclusion that the freedom to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism. Compatibilists of this stripe reject the idea that such freedom is necessary for meaningful forms of free will (e.g., Frankfurt 1969, 1971; Watson 1975, Dennett 1984)—the “varieties of free will worth wanting,” (Dennett 1984). And even more notably, some compatibilists simply deny that freedom of this sort is in any way connected to morally responsible agency (e.g., Fischer 1994, Fischer & Ravizza 1998, Scanlon 1998, Wallace 1994, Sartorio 2016)."

This is the position of the paper above essentially. It references Dennett. The kind of freedom that matters, and that ppl are talking about in everyday life, is not the type of freedom incompatibilists reject. It still makes sense to talk about freedom, as in "freedom of opinion" etc, even if agents could not have chosen differently.

The paper explains this position from the perspective of reinforcement learning, and also gives a theory for why it is beneficial for intelligent agents to model themselves as being able to have chosen differently even if they actually could not.

[raindeer2]

Compatibilists often argue that determinism and free will (and moral responsibility) are compatible since their view is that what constitutes freedom is not affected by whether or not determinism holds. Hence, in this case, the debate is not about the consequences of determinism, but rather what freedom is.

In my mind, that the known laws of nature do not permit "free will" in the way incompatibilists define it is trivial. (regardless of whether the universe is truly deterministic or also has some randomness sprinkled on top)

[GoblinSlayer]

>If we assume that the materialists are right (i.e., that we lack free will)

Yep, philosophic aspect of the article one big facepalm.

[raindeer2]

Why?