[strogonoff]

It was more about what aspects of the future we are capable of predicting thanks to natural sciences, and what aspects of the future are valuable to predict.

It might just be that predicting the outcome of an interaction of two molecules is itself less valuable than, say (can’t think of anything better, feel free to be more creatively specific here), predicting whether we flourish or suffer. The former is easier, sure, but is that enough to make it valuable? That the latter is more important is an assumption, but I think not an unfounded one.

[lisper]

So first of all, "natural sciences" is redundant. All science is natural. There is no unnatural science.

And second, what makes you think that predicting how molecules interact is detached from predicting whether we flourish or suffer? We are made of molecules. Whether we flourish or suffer is ultimately determined by what our molecules do. There are people alive today who would not be if we had not been able to make reliable predictions about how mRNA molecules were going to interact with the molecules in our bodies to produce antibodies (which are molecules) to fight the covid virus (also made of molecules).

[strogonoff]

> All science is natural. There is no unnatural science.

It is a well defined category. Sciences that do not fall into the tiny subset of natural sciences include, among others, mathematics, logic, sociology, economics, psychology, and the mother of all sciences—philosophy.

> Whether we flourish or suffer is ultimately determined by what our molecules do

Not really—unless you can prove that consciousness arises from said molecules (which not only is yet-unproven but is also arguably unfalsifiable within the framework of scientific method), it is only your opinion and not a scientific fact.

[lisper]

> It is a well defined category.

No, it isn't. I know that it is commonly considered to be a well-defined category, but it's not. Philosophy is not a science at all. Neither is math, except insofar as it is studied as a natural phenomenon. The so-called "social sciences" are commonly set apart in a different category, but in the context of your comment:

> It was more about what aspects of the future we are capable of predicting thanks to natural sciences

that a distinction without a difference. It is not the distinction between "natural" and "social" that matters in this case, it is the distinction between areas of intellectual inquiry that employ the scientific method vs those that don't.

> unless you can prove...

You need to read this:

https://blog.rongarret.info/2024/04/three-myths-about-scient...

See myth #3.

[strogonoff]

> Philosophy is not a science at all.

If you want to go there then sure, in some ways it is not. It is what natural sciences branched off of. Generally speaking, it is superior to sciences in that they are informed by it. Not sure if it’s splitting hairs in context of our discussion.

> Neither is math

Oxford dictionary starts with “it is a science…”, why do you say it is not?

> The so-called "social sciences" are commonly set apart in a different category

A different category from natural sciences. You’re seeing it now!

> it is the distinction between areas of intellectual inquiry that employ the scientific method vs those that don't.

Let’s talk about scientific method.

Scientific method is a key instrument of natural sciences, but it cannot make a statement about “underlying reality”, say materialism or physicalism vs. idealism. It can just make testable observations and predictions; the exact underlying territory can never be produced using scientific method—there can only be speculative takes on it, produced by our fallible human minds, informed by applying scientific method in particular ways guided by our fallible human minds.

A position that molecules is what causes us to flourish or not, meanwhile, is textbook physicalism. It is a particular philosophical view that is not within the scope of natural sciences to prove or disprove. The article you linked to actually supports this argument. See myth #2.

It does not make natural sciences deficient, but it highlights what they offer and what they by design don’t. Philosophical positions such as monistic idealism or monistic materialism have both equal capability to be true, and unfortunately both are (as of now) beyond what scientific method can prove or falsify.

[lisper]

> It is what natural sciences branched off of.

Yes, that's true. But it wasn't science before the branching, and what is left over after the branching is not science either.

> Oxford dictionary starts with “it is a science…”, why do you say it is not?

Math is a tool used by science, but it is not in and of itself a science (with a few exceptions). The reason is that this discussion is taking place within the context of a specific definition of science that requires experimental data to verify or refute hypotheses. Math generally doesn't fit that definition.

> Scientific method ... cannot make a statement about “underlying reality” ...

Yes, all that is true.

> A position that molecules is what causes us to flourish or not, meanwhile, is textbook physicalism.

No, it's a testable hypothesis with a lot of supporting evidence.

[strogonoff]

> what is left over after the branching is not science either

Yes. I’d say philosophy is not science in the same sense music is not drumming.

> this discussion is taking place within the context of a specific definition of science that requires experimental data to verify or refute hypotheses

Did we agree to that specific definition? If so, my bad, but I don’t recall that. Also, what are some other definitions available?

In any case, there are natural sciences, and there are other kinds of sciences that are not less important, and potentially more so depending on one’s values.

> No, it's a testable hypothesis with a lot of supporting evidence.

Not as far as I know.

There are plenty of so-called “proofs” that include things like cutting or stimulating parts of the brain seemingly causing changes in mind-state, but they obviously miss the part where the very cutting or the stimulating is caused by mind-state in the first place—i.e., they all presuppose materialism without even realizing it.

What is a way to definitively prove or falsify idealism or materialism that is available to us, without presupposing either idealism or materialism in the first place?

What is one piece of hard evidence that actually works as evidence to prove materialism without presupposing materialism?