| HN Mirror

The Court held, on the basis of the vast body of evidence before it, that Russia had effective control over all areas in the hands of separatists from 11 May 2014 on account of its military presence in eastern Ukraine and the decisive degree of influence it enjoyed over these areas as a result of its military, political and economic support to the “DPR” and the “LPR”. In particular, the Court found it established beyond any reasonable doubt that there had been Russian military personnel present in an active capacity in Donbass from April 2014 and that there had been a large-scale deployment of Russian troops from, at the very latest, August 2014. It further found that the respondent State had a significant influence on the separatists’ military strategy. Several prominent separatists in command positions were senior members of the Russian military acting under Russian instructions, including the person who had had formal overall command of the armed forces of the “DPR” and the “LPR”. Further, Russia had provided weapons and other military equipment to separatists on a significant scale (including the Buk-missile used to shoot down flight MH17). Russia had carried out artillery attacks upon requests from the separatists and provided other military support. There was also clear evidence of political support, including at international level, being provided to the “DPR” and the “LPR” and the Russian Federation had played a significant role in their financing enabling their economic survival. By the time of the 11 May 2014 “referendums”, the separatist operation as a whole had been managed and coordinated by the Russian Federation. The threshold for establishing Russian jurisdiction in respect of allegations concerning events which took place within these areas after 11 May 2014 had therefore been passed. That finding meant that the acts and omissions of the separatists were automatically attributable to the Russian Federation. /---/ In the absence of any evidence demonstrating that the dependence of the entities on Russia had decreased since 2014, the jurisdiction of the respondent State continued as at the date of the hearing on 26 January 2022.

I actually agree with most of that. But you're missing some important timelines. The breakaway regions did not breakaway in May, they broke away immediately after the coup in March. And yes at that point Russia began plying them with support. The only thing that happened in May was the Donbas referendum. And that referendum was indeed most almost certainly illegitimate. Consequently, it was officially recognized by nobody - including Russia, who instead simply opined, somewhat tongue in cheek, that they "respect the will of the population of the regions." [1] Russia even tried to encourage the leaders of the breakaway regions to hold the referendum later (probably knowing they could not legitimately obtain the support required for action), but they chose to move ahead with a sham referendum anyhow.

But the point here is that the civil war began in March. Could Ukraine have snuffed out the rebellious regions without Russian interference? Most likely, but countries feeding arms and support to rebellions that they support is pretty run of the mill geopolitics stuff (and was also 100% expected by the US per the diplomatic cables). Similarly, it's highly unlikely that the Ukrainian coup would have succeeded without US backing and direct involvement. In the 8 years that followed (until the invasion) Russia repeatedly tried to organize some sort of a cease fire and mutually agreeable solution for the breakaway regions - basically letting them have some sort of special administrative status while remaining part of Ukraine. This resulted in the Minsk accords. Those accords were then repeatedly violated, with both sides blaming the other, until the situation reached a climax in 2022.

[1] - https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/world/europe/ukraine.html