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> because these institutions protect them. All I am saying is that you could replace your antagonists in that line with "journalists" and you'd be like, "no wait, that's not true," and you'd be as wrong about journalists as anyone else. Either there are some powerful institutions protecting journalists too, OR Tor is powerful enough to protect journalists. If it's not good enough for journalists, why bother? If it's good enough for journalists, listen, it's also good enough for criminals. Anyway, some journalists are themselves powerful people! Maggie Haberman, John Carreyrou and Ronan Farrow are powerful people, and they don't need anonymity. There are powerless criminals too, I'm sure, who need anonymity to engage in criminal conduct without getting caught. You could live on an island with a Starlink Internet connection, literally divorced from institutions and communities, and you could engage in anonymous criminal activity with Tor, it would be your only way of doing that. It would be practicable and realistic. Where we really disagree is: I think the average person already lives in a metaphorical island, this isn't a fringe opinion, and thus no matter what they are doing, Tor is providing them not with anonymity - they are already anonymous in almost all ways that matter, already nobody cares what the average person is up to - Tor is providing them protection from law enforcement. > chaotic and anarchic coalition Those high drama characters were the only ones foolish enough to run exit nodes or relays. I am confident this is true but I have not investigated: not a single professional NGO employee or grant recipient, living in New York or Los Angeles, under the age of 40, is personally running a Tor exit node. Those professionals are absolutely correct in their assessment that they would receive a much harsher punishment for so much as breathing on the third rail criminal activity on Tor compared to their colleagues who engage in some civil disobedience on highways here or there. And without exit nodes or relays, there's no Tor. |
And given that the vast majority of online crime of all kinds isn't anonymous but goes entirely un-enforced against by law enforcement, I would argue that Tor's efforts to distribute power online make relatively little impact on the kinds of crime and harm we see online compared to a lot of other infrastructures built on top of the Internet. I've generally found the more I do this kind of research, the less convinced I am by technical fixes to major social problems - I don't think Tor is a 'fix' to the problem of power, but I think it opens up the battleground a bit for more different (and possibly more hopeful) kinds of future Internet to be built and asserted, that look less like the locked down and centralised versions we're being pitched just now. But I take your points and appreciate you engaging with the arguments in the book.
Actually the relay community is pretty diverse - they have some colourful characters but actually a lot of them are just IT professionals, activists, and people working for libraries or universities. They have come up with some ways (which I talk about in the book) of making them much less likely to get hassle for running an exit - and generally most exit relay operators proceed just fine.