[knightoffaith]

>Creation is the maximal object that could be created from God

Well, just the only one, but I suppose the maximal element of a set with one element is just that element, so yeah.

>Creation determines God, in that God is the minimal object that could create the Creation

Well, the only thing that could create Creation, but I suppose the minimal element of a set with one element is just that element, so yeah.

>Aquinas defo would've been unhappy with the "the deity can create any universe he wants, as long as it's black" part.

Hmm, I don't know what you mean by this. Spinoza isn't saying this, Spinoza is saying that God must have created only this universe, and everything that God does is necessary---there's nothing else he can do.

>if our universe only uses up two attributes

OK, so it's not that our universe is only uses two attributes, it's that we can only perceive things with respect to two attributes. There's only one possible universe, which is this one, and it's necessarily this one.

[082349872349872]

Yes, I was purposely playing with the trivial definitions of maximal and minimal (max{x} = min{x} = x) to draw out an analogy with the modern concept of Galois Connections.

> there's nothing else he can do.

Right, and I thought Aquinas' take was that he must be capable of doing otherwise, but doesn't.

> we can only perceive things with respect to two attributes

Aha, so this universe uses all (are they countable?) attributes, but we imperfect finite creatures only perceive thought and extension; angels might perceive three, or a dozen, or all the attributes? (which would make sense: Samuel Johnson can both think of a rock and perceive its extension of mass in space, but the rock, while it might "perceive" the extension of Johnson's foot in space does not think of Johnson. So a creature beyond us as we are beyond the rock might have metathought? "be not afraid" indeed!)

[knightoffaith]

>Right, and I thought Aquinas' take was that he must be capable of doing otherwise, but doesn't.

Yep, that's right.

>are they countable?

Spinoza doesn't specify.

But yep, in principle other attributes could be perceived---they are perceived, for example, by God for Spinoza.

[082349872349872]

> Yep, that's right.

That's another reason to introduce the maximal and minimal: those def'ns would still go through even with an Aquinas-style god.

(and they yield an irreligious 1=3 trinitarian argument: if C takes a god to its maximal creation, and G takes a creation to its minimal god, then CG and GC are not necessarily the identity, but we do necessarily have C = CGC and G = GCG)

[082349872349872]

noting in passing; a possible influence: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plotinus#One

[knightoffaith]

Definitely, Neoplatonism was a big influence on Abrahamic philosophical thought. Though the real locus classicus for God is Aristotle's Metaphysics, specifically his description of the unmoved mover. There are some not-so-minor differences between Aristotle's theology and Abrahamic theology, but God insofar as he is the ground of all being is a concept that most clearly originated in Aristotle's work.