[opt-skept]

Okay, so for (b) we agree that China does not want to agitate a war with the US; that it would like to avoid it.

For (a) you do not have an area of critique where you believe any chain of logic presented earlier in the thread in unsound. Instead for (a) you have an alternative theory that you would advance.

The reason I thought you had some critique of soundness in (a) is that you had commented earlier you thought there was wild mental gymnastics, which would imply that you thought there was some unsound/crazy/wild leaps of thought.

This I think leaves us to discuss (a). Your proposed alternative theory agrees on the premise that the US would be the one choosing to engage military with China - that China would not choose to attack the United States. The key difference in your theory is that the United States "begrudgingly" would be obligated to engage militarily with China such as due to a legal commitment. This is opposed to the characterization that I advanced, which is that the United States is "leaning into" reasons to engage militarily with China.

I can explain why I do not think that the US would "begrudgingly feel obligated" and instead is "leaning into reasons". This is quite simple (I will spare spilled ink).

The US established in 2009 that China was its primary rival (in 2009 the Obama Administration announces the "Pivot to Asia", which Wikipedia describes as "represented a significant shift in the foreign policy of the United States ... invest heavily and build relationships in [Asia] ... to counter [China's] rise as a rival superpower"). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Asian_foreign_policy_of_t...

Since that time the reasons for a potential US conflict with China have kept changing. Once it was because of "unfair trade practices". It became for a while "Uighurs". "Tibet". "Defense of India". "South China Sea". "Taiwan". The constant over time is the explicitly and carefully articulated reason given by the US government itself that it needs to counter China as a rising superpower. The areas of conflict have been, are, and will continue to be, subject to change.

The US had almost certainly has no legal obligation to intervene on part of its "allies" (the Philippines only unless you have other legal allies in mind?) nor does it have any obligation to intervene for Taiwan. From a legal perspective again the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines (who I assume you refer to by "allies") was effectively dead (with US bases, soldiers, exiting the region by early 1990s). It was only in 2021 (!) long long after the US identified the need to confront China that the US renewed this treaty (after the Philippines suggest it be scrapped). Neither the Philippine's specious claims to the Spratly Islands the a BRP Sierra Madre scenario would obligate a US intervention.

I would add that the US even insisted on intervening on behalf of the Philippines even when the Philippines itself rejected the United States and called for it to not engage in the area. This is how desperate the US has been to try to engineer something here. (The new Philippine administration has been easier for the US to work with).

Indeed the United States has been accelerating its efforts to grow treaties, obligations, and military basing in China's near abroad. From the Compacts of Free Association to the Nuclear "AUKUS" to the Quad, to its quite scandalous attempt at the Trans Pacific Partnership, the US's foreign policy has attempted to constrain the growth of China and attempted to engineer plausible scenarios in which it might escalate tensions with China into a victory.

China's interest in the South China Sea? To prevent an existential economic blow severing its ability to trade, a la the blockade that occurred during the Anglo-Chinese War. (Interestingly, and an aside only, Taiwan agrees with the Republic of China on Qing and earlier Chinese historical rights to the area).

Regarding such a confrontation? What would a war scenario look like? It would involve much more than the defense of the Sierra Madre or the defense of the Taiwan strait. The US military's footprint and conflict plan escalation from where-ever a conflict may arise to a blockade and strikes into China, even if it is not operationally called for (to defend a littoral, or whatever).

The US and Taiwan? The US's policy since the inception of relations with the island (despite being legally obligated to recognize Taiwan as part of the Republic of China) has been "strategic ambiguity" - to be purposefully vague about whether it will come to the defense of the island in order to discourage the status quo from changing.

The US, only after identifying its grand strategic need to prevent the rise of its superpower rival, has changed this policy, explicitly stating the US will defend Taiwan (again, no legal obligation) to encourage it to declare independence (again - despite US legal recognition).

US President Trump - China hawk of China hawks - first action as president was to call the leadership in Taiwan, a protocol breaking and intentionally provocative move intended to signal the US's intention to rock the boat and agitate for conflict with China.

I submit to you the "Pivot to Asia". The US first identified the need to confront a rising China as a rising superpower competitor more than a decade ago, and has since found various potential plausible means by which a conflict might occur and the US might escalate to situation in which China's potential is diminished.

[wumeow]

Ok, your post is just pure gish galloping. Basically, you think that the US is forging alliances in the Indo-Pacific because it wants an excuse to go to war with China and crush it. In reality, the US is using its military, specifically it’s deterrence capability as a bargaining chip in alliances with countries who are fed up with China. Yes, it wants to counter China’s rise but it’s doing that through diplomacy. If China doesn’t like this, they are free to start acting like a good neighbor, but it seems that’s not their plan.

[opt-skept]

Today I learned "gish galloping". No, I am a wordy person and I apologize for that. I think you'll find it isn't an excessive amount of arguments, but an excessive amount of detail to a very straightforward argument. At least that is my hope.

> Basically, you think that the US is forging alliances in the Indo-Pacific because really it wants an excuse to go to war with China and crush it. In reality, the US is using its military, specifically it’s deterrence capability as a bargaining chip in alliances with countries who are fed up with China.

Yes in broad strokes. I'm trying to not add nuance now.

However I would disagree with the "countries that are fed up with China" - that's a very American narrative but based on polls and looking from the region, these countries are mostly looking for whoever will give them the best bargain and play both sides.

> Yes, it wants to counter China’s rise

Right, I'm glad we agree on that.

> but it’s doing that through diplomacy.

I don't see this as very possible in any case. What country could convince through diplomacy another country to e.g. stop growing its economy? Are there any such examples?

Do you have any examples of diplomatic missions or examples you think show the US as having done this?

Anyhow, I'm glad we started out with my doing mental gymnastics, but now we agree that the US wants to prevent China's rise and that China is trying to avoid military conflict with the US. None of this is super crazy / convoluted.

Regards for sticking with my verboseness.

[wumeow]

Your mental gymnastics is concluding that the US wants to start a war with China. And I don’t mean diplomacy with China, I mean diplomacy with the other Indo-Pacific countries.

[opt-skept]

Sorry in advance for the verbosity, but I really feel like we're crossing paths.

The US doesn't want to start a war with China. The US wants to prevent China's rise. It wants to do this as cheaply and as efficiently as possible, and if it could do it by a cheap cyberop/magic-wand/whathaveyou it would. However it has coarse tools to affect this and no easy, cheap answers. And its willing to do it expensive ways (war) if need be.

It therefore has an array of economic, diplomatic, military, and intelligence tracks attempting to prevent China's rise and raise its costs in a myriad of ways. These all create instability and risk war.

The US is, in its attempt to prevent the rise of China, and China in its attempt to continue to grow in power, in a Thucydides Trap - where conflict between them grows. China - in its role is attempting to grow does so by attempting to minimize the amount of tension and risk of conflict with the United States. Because strategically, that's its win condition. It grows.

The US on the other hand, is attempting to increase as much tension and conflict as it can with China, in order to problematize its rise. This may lead to a war (the "trap" in Thucydides Trap), but it is not inevitable.

The examples are plentiful (and as you've discovered I'm verbose) so probe and we can get into that.

I'll just repeat one example from earlier. Before the US was attempting to prevent China's rise, it's policy with regard to Taiwan was to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence and prevent mainland from attempting to annex. This was to create stability and maintain the status quo. It did this by being ambigious about what it would do in such a scenario. This was the policy for ~50 years and it was successful at stabilizing the region.

Once the US's policy became preventing China's rise, it's policy toward Taiwan has been to claim that it will defend Taiwan. The reason for this policy is to encourage Taiwan to declare independence, and to make China worry about this possibility, and encouraging it to attempt to act before it becomes too late. The US is succeeding in this policy of destabilizing the region.

This amounts to agitating for a war. That is not the same thing as wanting to start a war (e.g. "for wars own sake").

I wonder what you agree with, disagree with about this.

[wumeow]

> The US doesn't want to start a war with China. The US wants to prevent China's rise. It wants to do this as cheaply and as efficiently as possible, and if it could do it by a cheap cyberop/magic-wand/whathaveyou it would. However it has coarse tools to affect this and no easy, cheap answers.

The US wants to prevent China's rise to global hegemon status. It has no problem with China growing in general.

> And its willing to do it expensive ways (war) if need be.

"If need be" being China starts a conflict with it's neighbors who have asked the US for help. The US will not launch missiles at China if their GDP grows too high or the BRI grows larger.

> It therefore has an array of economic, diplomatic, military, and intelligence tracks attempting to prevent China's rise and raise its costs in a myriad of ways. These all create instability and risk war.

No, the country causing instability here is the one launching missiles into the Taiwan Strait (which was happening long before the "Pivot to East Asia"), salami slicing territory, attacking vessels in the South China sea, and starting border skirmishes with India. US diplomacy and military deterrence aren't causing instability, they are holding it back.

> The US is, in its attempt to prevent the rise of China, and China in its attempt to continue to grow in power, in a Thucydides Trap - where conflict between them grows. China - in its role is attempting to grow does so by attempting to minimize the amount of tension and risk of conflict with the United States. Because strategically, that's its win condition. It grows.

Wrong. If China wanted to minimize risk of conflict with the US, it would cease stealing US IP and military secrets (again, started happening before "Pivot to East Asia"), operating unofficial police stations on US soil, hacking into US companies and infrastructure, etc. China wants to keep tensions just below the threshold that would trigger a serious conflict while antagonizing the US in ways that help it grow.

> The US on the other hand, is attempting to increase as much tension and conflict as it can with China, in order to problematize its rise. This may lead to a war (the "trap" in Thucydides Trap), but it is not inevitable. I'll just repeat one example from earlier. Before the US was attempting to prevent China's rise, it's policy with regard to Taiwan was to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence and prevent mainland from attempting to annex.

> Once the US's policy became preventing China's rise, it's policy toward Taiwan has been to claim that it will defend Taiwan. The reason for this policy is to encourage Taiwan to declare independence, and to make China worry about this possibility, and encouraging it to attempt to act before it becomes too late. The US is succeeding in this policy of destabilizing the region.

This is why I dismissed the earlier post as a gish gallop, because it was full of subtly wrong things like this that I didn't want to spend time debunking. The US policy is still strategic ambiguity. Biden has made multiple remarks that the US would defend Taiwan, but they've always been walked back by the White House. Bush made similar remarks in 2000 and 2001, before the "Pivot to East Asia", and they were also walked back. The US still abides by the 45 year old Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances. Meanwhile, China decides to surround the island with warships and conduct live-fire exercises because a single US representative visits. Who is the one destabilizing the region again?

I see no reason for this conversation to continue any further at this point. Bye.

[createdapril24]

Posting from another account (home vs work computer). You can reach me at either.

> The US wants to prevent China's rise to global hegemon status. It has no problem with China growing in general.

The US want to prevent China's rise to even a regional hegemon status. It has a problem even with China growing to equal economic power (without a "hegemonic" component").

It would be hard to separate "growth in general" from "growth that contributes to a relative power gap narrowing." They are practically indistinguishable, so I don't see much point in trying to test from it.

> "If need be" being China starts a conflict with it's neighbors who have asked the US for help. The US will not launch missiles at China if their GDP grows too high or the BRI grows larger.

Which neighbors? So far we've discussed Philippines and Taiwan and shown this isn't true.

> The US will not launch missiles at China if their GDP grows too high or the BRI grows larger.

It would. But it would engineer a conflict to justify such an act by.

> No, the country causing instability here is the one launching missiles into the Taiwan Strait (which was happening long before the "Pivot to East Asia"), salami slicing territory, attacking vessels in the South China sea, and starting border skirmishes with India. US diplomacy and military deterrence aren't causing instability, they are holding it back.

No. The US has undertaken a significantly different policy position in order to engineer, amplify, and become in involved in existing and new disputes (which all countries have).

> Wrong. If China wanted to minimize risk of conflict with the US, it would cease stealing US IP and military secrets (again, started happening before "Pivot to East Asia"), operating unofficial police stations on US soil, hacking into US companies and infrastructure, etc. China wants to keep tensions just below the threshold that would trigger a serious conflict while antagonizing the US in ways that help it grow.

Minimize risk within the context of the situation. It's absurd to think that a country trying to grow would just say, hey the US is creating conflict over this, let's shrink to minimize risk.

This is a straw man.

> This is why I dismissed the earlier post as a gish gallop, because it was full of subtly wrong things like this that I didn't want to spend time debunking.

This has been the pattern so far though. Lots of high level accusations ("that's mental gymnastics") and no substantive specific points. If there are factual errors, discuss them, and draw out where there are issues. In any case, having a "subtlely wrong thing" is a far cry from your claim of "mental gymastics". I'm honestly trying to figure out where you think factually and logically this is wrong. What you've provided so far is hard for me to differentiate from grief over preferred vocabulary, high level pronouncements, and advancing a different but not contradictory idea.

> Biden has made multiple remarks that the US would defend Taiwan, but they've always been walked back by the White House.

This is a political tactic. It's like when Biden stated Putin should be assassinated, and then later in a small statement it's made "not official".

This is clearly and evidently the US policy, as its pushing allies and forming coalitions to interfere in a strait crisis. If this was just some rouge statement by a lone official (accidentally: the President) none of those efforts would be underway.

> Bush made similar remarks in 2000 and 2001, before the "Pivot to East Asia", and they were also walked back

Right. The Bush Administration had considered making this pivot before the Obama Administration actually did, but got bogged down in the Middle East. Interesting point though.

> The US still abides by the 45 year old Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances.

For some very complex definition of "abides." The US was supposed to reduce military shipments to Taiwan. They've increased them. The US is supposed to recognize Taiwan as part of the Republic of China. It's amplified language of independence.

> Meanwhile, China decides to surround the island with warships and conduct live-fire exercises because a single US representative visits

A US representative visit is an act of recognition of statehood. An example of the change in policy that you deny above. And an example of the US not "abiding" by Taiwan treaties.

> Who is the one destabilizing the region again?

The US, as clearly evidenced by all of the above.

> I see no reason for this conversation to continue any further at this point. Bye.

What is it that you were trying to get out of the conversation? I was (and am) trying to establish specific factual and logical context framing. Ultimately the purpose is to support the very top post - which is to understand how and why China would use access established to US infrastructure.

Based on your comment I suspect that you agree in most part with China only using that in case they engage with the US. But you'd not frame their access as a "deterrent" but as something else. Like "aggression". But it would all be flip flopped around with the facts not subtly wrong.

I'm happy to continue to discuss. But I think we can both agree about the top comment that China isn't collecting this as a surprise weapon, but in case the US engages in, and as a deterrent to, the US engaging in military activity against it.

Regards.