[alex201]

I've never quite seen eye to eye with Daniel Dennett. His tendency to reduce the inexplicable to what he's confident he understands has always made me wonder if a challenging childhood might have fostered his distrust of the mysterious. Whenever I admire Nobel Prize laureates like Roger Penrose, who argue that consciousness isn't just software running on the brain's hardware, I can't help but feel a twinge of pity for Dennett and his like-minded peers. I can almost hear him reflecting, 'Wow, that was a wild ride, but boy, was I cranky! I wish I could have another go at it.

[tasty_freeze]

There is an infinity of mysterious things one could posit, including an infinity of mutually incompatible mysteries. How do you decide which mysteries are worthy of consideration?

Personally, I think starting with things are known to exist, which have a physical basis, is a great start, and untestable assumptions should be kept to a minimum. Just because it would be delightful to contemplate that ornately feathered technicolor quantum unicorns are actually underlying all of reality, it isn't productive to consider until there is a reason to.

Penrose is no doubt a genius of high order in his domain, but consciousness is not one of his domains. Saying consciousness is the result of quantum effects in microtubules explains nothing -- it is just a very tiny rug which one could imagine is hiding the truth, as all the larger scale hiding places have been inspected and found lacking.

You'd think that with the stunning (and mostly unexpected) success of LLMs would expose the fact that simple, soul-free, mechanistic computations can produce some really amazing capabilities. The human brain is orders of magnitude larger than GPT4, plus it has a wildly more complex architecture than today's neural networks. To me, it takes little imagination to see how everything could be explained in purely physical terms.

[alex201]

Consciousness is the most obvious mystery, one that undoubtedly warrants considerable attention.

Your point about starting with physical things is questionable, as highlighted by prominent figures like Penrose and Donald Hoffman. The fundamentalism of materialism is an axiom that lacks proof.

Perhaps to you 'saying consciousness is the result of quantum effects in microtubules explains nothing', but so does Dennett's saying 'consciousness is an illusion', which equals 'I'm not sure what it is, but I will dismiss it because I would rather ridicule the unknown than accept my ignorance.'

At least Penrose denies what is deniable to open the door for a broader perspective, something that Dennett failed at.

I bet you think an LLM can experience what the color red feels like, or it can feel the scent of a rose, if it's fed enough 1/0's about it.

[astrange]

> Saying consciousness is the result of quantum effects in microtubules explains nothing -- it is just a very tiny rug which one could imagine is hiding the truth, as all the larger scale hiding places have been inspected and found lacking.

It also doesn't conflict with physicalism. I think he's trying to argue that consciousness would need more than you can do with a classical computer, but it doesn't seem to imply that. Classical computers are made of hardware components that rely on quantum effects to work, but that doesn't make them "quantum computers".

[tasty_freeze]

Everything relies on quantum effects. Water wouldn't behave like water. Gold metal would have a different color, etc.

All the same, I don't think there is special quantum magic above and beyond the "ordinary" quantum phenomena needed to explain our brains.

[astrange]

Well quantum computers definitely have "quantum magic"; for some reason the universe lets us build something that can do Shor's algorithm in less than forever. Even if we can't actually do it yet.

But it doesn't seem like human brains are doing Shor's algorithm.

[astrange]

Being a Nobel laureate isn't evidence that you're right about anything after that. I'm sorry you'd like the supernatural to be true but you should find some ghosts first if you want anyone to believe in them.

[n4r9]

> made me wonder if a challenging childhood might have fostered his distrust of the mysterious

Why this, and not simply an urge to understand things?

[alex201]

Understand things? He has never successfully explained anything related to consciousness except by using the magical word: illusion. One might argue back, 'You're the illusion, Mr. Dennett,' and we end up as a bunch of ignorant folks pointing fingers.

[n4r9]

I get that you disagree with him. Just saying it's unfair to assume that his natural curiosity stems from some kind of trauma.

[wzdd]

> His tendency to reduce the inexplicable to what he's confident he understands

Coming up with theories to explain the inexplicable is literally science.

Also, suggesting that Dennet's philosophy stems from a "challenging childhood" is argument ad hominem, because it focuses on the person, rather than on the content of the philosophy.

To continue the discussion in the same tone that you began it, perhaps you don't see eye to eye with him because he challenges your beliefs.