[baronswindle]

It is...kind of. But we're talking about severely limiting the ability of insurers to distinguish high risk parties from low risk parties and price accordingly. When the insured parties have limited agency over the risk they present — as with, e.g., health insurance for congenital diseases — this kind of regulation can make sense. But when insured parties can control the risk, such regulation usually makes insurance markets much less efficient. Essentially, it takes away the incentive for insured parties to avoid risky behaviors, creating moral hazard. This is a well-understood mechanism for market failures.

[jeffbee]

We already have this problem with car insurance in California. In the 1980s, at the tail end of a long series of stupid initiative ballot measures, Californians wrote down that there are only 2 strata of risk: good drivers, and everyone else. "Good Driver" is defined as a person who has had a license for 3 years without killing or injuring anyone. Because of this, California is the only American state where the law requires that a middle-aged person who drives a base model Honda Fit, and a 19-year-old with a Dodge Hellcat who miraculously hasn't killed anyone, yet, that we know of, both get the same "discount". And consequently it is unlawful here to offer those telematics systems that charge less to good drivers and more to bad ones.

[brogrammernot]

Yup, I hated reviewing California based book of business.

Everyone is upset their rate is going up but the issue is lack of ability to use predictive underwriting because of what you said and more.

[spopejoy]

I think it needs to also be acknowledged that insurance itself is a moral hazard. Focusing on the "efficiency" and moral hazards of only the insureds is an incomplete analysis.

Insurance is a for-profit enterprise and as an expert told me, "the goal of insurance companies is to not pay claims". It essentially wants to be passive income at the end of the day.

Modern capitalism runs on insurance but should it? Health insurance is a great example: it shouldn't exist, and is unnecessary in single-payer systems. Car insurance is another example, where you can argue that insurance is locked-in to hide the fact that cars are systematically unsafe. Note how you don't need insurance to ride the subway.

The point is, insurance exists to make rich people richer off of risks that could be addressed socially in other ways. When we see that entire states are losing home insurance because of other systematic problems like climate change we should look at the system itself. Maybe making profit off of people's unavoidable risk isn't a great idea.

EDIT: in response to parent, my point is that focusing on the ills of regulators harming efficiency needs to account for the impossible job regulators have in the first place, which is making an unfair system (insurance) fair.