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by runarberg
817 days ago
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This is a UN security council resolution. The enforcement mechanism is [kinda; see child] implied. The resolutions them selves hardly ever specify how enforcement works. It is assumed that they are obeyed, and then other member states will decide punitive measures when non-compliance is evident. This usually means sanctions, breaking of diplomatic ties, etc. and—in the case of Israel—probably arms embargo. > If hamas refuse to release all hostages, what is supposed to happen? That is not really the most important question right now. Hamas has shown compliance with previous hostage release plans. If there is a ceasefire, hostages will probably be released (at least the civilian ones). Now the resolution calls for all hostages to be released unconditionally. I don’t think anybody is under the illusion that Hamas will comply with that. Instead what most organizations are hoping for is hostage negotiations, where the military hostages will be released in exchange for Palestinians illegally detained in Israeli prisons. In any other context this would be called a prisoner swap. That said, the main issue is Israeli compliance, if there is no ceasefire, no hostages will be released. Not only is it against Hamas’s interest to release the hostages without a ceasefire, but it is also a logistical nightmare, and it puts the lives of the hostages in even further danger. This is what most states and organizations are worried about. And Israel is giving people ample justification for those worries. |
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No, it is not (unless by the “enforcement mechanism” that “is implied” you mean “returning to the council to debate a subsequent resolution on enforcement”.) UN Security Council resolutions that want, or even permit, enforcement beyond countries acting as they would be legally empowered under international law without a resolution explicitly authorize nations to enforce it by either particular means or with language like “by all necessary means”.
See, e.g.. SC Res 678 (1990), in relevant part:
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1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;
2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the above-mentioned resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore International peace and security in the area;
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EDIT: But, as that resolution and its reference to 660 illustrates, it is common practice to have a pure demand resolution followed by a demand-with-enforcement resolution; its far less common to jump straight to demand-with-enforcement, IIRC. So, this isn't inconsistent with the pass to a materially enforced resolution, but its still in the pure demand phase.
OTOH, its pretty hard to see enforcement against either side not getting vetoed by each sides P5 supporters, and it doesn't look like either side is inclined to comply voluntarily.