[zero-sharp]

I was responding to somebody who said a person's subjective experience cannot be conveyed to another person. We obviously have an abundance of evidence saying that we can manipulate our consciousness and experience through physical means. I also provided an example of how we could, theoretically, convey an experience.

I have to reread the "big problem of consciousness", but I think there are several concerns that have to be addressed. There's the question of how we identify what is and isn't conscious, whatever that means. But the question of how subjective experience, particularly in the human nervous system, arises from physical processes is really uninteresting to me.

[smnplk]

>>> But the question of how subjective experience, particularly in the human nervous system, arises from physical processes is really uninteresting to me.

And yet it is one of the most interesting and profound question that kept philosophers and scientists awake at night for centuries. Even Ed Witten said that he has a much easier time imagining humans understanding the big bang than to ever understand consciousness.

[zero-sharp]

I mean, you understand that there's plenty of thinkers who have different opinions on the matter, right? There's plenty of questions of the past that kept philosophers awake that are really mundane today.

And again, I still don't know why we speculate so much about something we can't yet examine scientifically and test. It's one thing to have an incomplete scientific model, it's another thing to have philosophical arguments. What is the operational definition of consciousness? Is there one?