[sdht0]

To clarify, H and O and H2O are weakly emergent entities out of the artifacts of electrons/protons, similar to the copper in your example. The behavior of electrons and protons/neutrons completely explain the behavior of atoms and molecules.

And when electrons say annihilate by combining with a positron, then the artifact in this case is the say particle physics and energy conservation, whose behavior completely explains electrons and positrons, which then are emergent entities.

The naturalist claim is this happens all the way down to the base rules, which are the core never changing artifacts out of which all properties/behavior is emergent.

[sdht0]

So it seems I completely misused the word artifact above. I'll try again.

So my naturalist view is bottom up rather than top down. It is not that H2O exists and I'm trying to explain if the parts explain the whole. I'm saying the only thing that really exists is the First Cause. Everything else is an artifact (say) originating from different arrangements of this base reality.

I think it misleads us to try start with the concept of H2O and ask, is it made of its parts or is it something more. We should instead start with the base rules and see where they end up. In our universe, we end up with electrons and protons and when they combine in different ways, the behaviors of H and O and H2O emerge. And in general, any universe that starts from the physical laws of our universe but say different initial conditions will likely have H and O and H2O in it (there are caveats but the general idea holds).

[sdht0]

In short:

Q: Why do lions exist and unicorns don't, even though it could have been otherwise?

A: Because of the physical laws and initial conditions of our universe.

Q: Why these particular physical laws and initial conditions and not something else?

A: Impersonal First Cause

Q: Could there be other universes with unicorns or anti-gravity?

A: Possible but unknown. This multiverse could still be based on an impersonal First Cause.

My takeaway remains the same: A personal God is a logically valid possibility, but not a logical necessity, contrary to what the book claims.