[dmazzoni]

Yeah, it doesn't tell a website who you are. Instead, it allows them to recognize you again when you come back to visit again, even if you clear cookies.

This is particularly a problem with big advertiser networks because they can track you across many sites you visit, even if you disable third-party cookies.

It has positive uses too, like preventing click fraud and concert ticket arbitrage.

[Thorrez]

>Instead, it allows them to recognize you again when you come back to visit again, even if you clear cookies.

I don't think that's what stockhorn said. stockhorn said it can only identify a what browser and OS and laptop model you're using. Someone else with the same browser, OS, and laptop model would have the same fingerprint. So audio fingerprinting couldn't precisely recognize you again when you come back again.

[kmlx]

> Someone else with the same browser, OS, and laptop model would have the same fingerprint.

the collision rate of their ids is stated to be 0.05%

what they do is basically collect a lot of signals from the browser (audio processing stuff being only a part of it) and then compute an id on the server.

[azmodeus]

Browser, OS, laptop joined with IP looks like a pretty good ID

[ryan-c]

IP is a pretty good ID...

[fragmede]

NAT really.

[sgerenser]

I see what you did there…

[azinman2]

Not if you’re behind something NAT’d, which is especially true on mobile.

[spookie]

Still, parent does state a pretty big concern when looking at this from a higher vantage point.

These practices and their repercussions aren't self contained.