| > If you can't reason about your codebase to a sufficient extent to actually determine that then something is very wrong. Linux kernel developers are entirely capable of assessing this. They're just refusing to do it for someone else's definition of a "security bug". "Every bug is a security bug" means "we fix things when they need fixing, categorizing the fixes is not our job and you'll need to do that yourself". As such, the current new approach is in fact a concession, there's now a broad pre-categorizing of fixes you can work off. > making people not so familiar with the codebase (as the maintainers) do triage You seem to be under the impression that you hadn't needed to do that before. Which, to be fair, worked for a long time. From an engineering perspective this was always a case of "skipping inspections and verification", because the Linux community never agreed to do that work on top of providing the system. > I hope they get burnt quick by this approach. How would they get burnt by this? Social pressure from other kernel developers (or even outside) isn't going to have that effect. The only possible influence would be from employers paying for Linux work — in which case it's a perfectly reasonable discussion about spending paid time on security issues. |
Then instead of this, don't? It's utterly childish.
> How would they get burnt by this? Social pressure from other kernel developers (or even outside) isn't going to have that effect.
Fewer organisations willing to cooperate with them, for one? Social pressure comes in many forms and shapes, there's no way it won't have any effect.
> The only possible influence would be from employers paying for Linux work
They're going to be paying someone else to provide a clean feed instead of the organization that deliberately hinders these efforts.