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by michaelt
841 days ago
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There's plenty of people in that position, but they're all working at huge corporations. Nobody ends up having to chase things like SOC2 and PCI-DSS without getting paid for it. Why should unpaid volunteers working on the Linux kernel do compliance work for FAANG-sized companies without getting paid for it? If these companies want the reports carefully triaged, they can send some employees to carefully triage them. |
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A vulnerability / bug in an upstream component may or may not end up being a vulnerability in a complex system incorporating that component. A vulnerability in upstream functionality that is disabled (or not used, with no possible path through which an attacker could trigger the upstream vulnerability) in a particular system is not a vulnerability in that system. Standards like ISO27001, SOC2, and PCI-DSS generally ask teams to have processes to discover vulnerabilities, but not necessarily to patch things that are not vulnerabilities in practice.