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by lxgr
856 days ago
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Is this unexpected? When your PIN input and transaction confirmation device is untrusted, about the only thing a smart card can protect against is key exfiltration, and maybe rate limiting signature/authentication attempts (I believe the German protocol sends trusted timestamps from the remote reader which would allow that). Tapping your card and entering your PIN in a compromised app/on a compromised device has the same (and to me expected) result as tapping it on a fraudster’s device directly and providing them the PIN. |
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The terminal used the PIN for three transactions: The original sign-in process, the attacker's ID verification process for the bank, and a "Selbstauskunft" which essentially is an echo service that returns data read from the card back to the user.
It's not a very performant process and needs to happen near real time.