[bondarchuk]

Yes, this was a problem all along with arguments against surveillance (/encryption weakening) based on "it can be abused by bad actors" - it implies that one would be ok with surveillance if it could not be abused by bad actors. While it's tempting to use such arguments (it looks like they had effect in this case at least) it remains necessary to emphasize the true reasons one takes a stand against surveillance e.g. authoritarian overreach or a fundamental right to privacy.

[Karellen]

Do you think that phone taps and mail-opening warrants, issued by judges, based on evidence submitted to the court that such warrants are appropriately targetted and based on existing evidence and reasonable suspicion, are intrinsically "authoritarian overreach"?

[JoshTriplett]

Not inherently, but they become overreach when they start claiming that they should be able to apply to E2EE protocols.

If you want the data from an E2EE protocol, serve an appropriately targeted and scoped warrant to one of the endpoints. This also provides an opportunity for legal challenge (e.g. for scope overreach).