[jabbany]

This is somewhat counterintuitive but... the fraudulent mortgages are not more risky, they are often times more stable than other local borrowers.

I think what many people are imagining is the subprime mortgage situation of yore. But in this case, a lot of the "fraud" is the result of knock on effects from capital controls in the PRC. Many (new and aspiring immigrants) have capital from sales of their property in China, but due to capital controls, cannot get it out quickly. They have to do it in $50k/year chunks.

Usually a loan or mortgage is the solution for this, but those depend on _income_ rather than _wealth_, so normally these people can't take out as much as they need to, even though they could easily back actual value of the mortgage. So there's a little collusion between banks and mortgage brokers to get in on this market gap (probably more so now that interest rates are high, which these borrowers are much less sensitive to).

Of course, there are risks, but those risks are tied to more geopolitical circumstances and less market-driven, and apparently banks are more willing to take their chances on that.

[kasey_junk]

The issue here is that the geopolitical risks are hard to separate from the market risks.

If BC property is being fraudulently leveraged against Chinese real estate, opaque decisions by the ccp can dramatically impact default rate for Canadian loans.

No market actor would expect that in a non-fraud based market. Instead a transparent pricing of Chinese assets would show them as much less valuable on a risk adjusted basis than their book wealth value. Especially compared to western income or equivalent wealth.

[JumpCrisscross]

> the fraudulent mortgages are not more risky, they are often times more stable than other local borrowers

You don't know. The paperwork's fraudulent.

> Many (new and aspiring immigrants) have capital from sales of their property in China, but due to capital controls, cannot get it out quickly

The Chinese property market is in freefall. And capital controls can get tightened. Either condition will result in default.

[jabbany]

> You don't know. The paperwork's fraudulent.

They don't offer these services to anyone. Because the paperwork is fraudulent, a lot of people involved are/will be personally implicated (could easily lose their job and/or face legal challenges on top) in the scheme. It's not like banks are not monitoring delinquency/default rates already, and if the stats are start indicating problems they will certainly investigate...

So while outside observers can't verify anything, those perpetrating the scheme do have to balance their own personal risk and many will in exchange request invasive details around the clients' assets in China to cover their own ass. Not admissible evidence to the bank, of course, but they're not handing these out like candy.

> The Chinese property market is in freefall.

Realistically, people involved have already sold so this doesn't affect them. At least in the Vancouver area, the brokers (who are the usual point-of-contact to the clients) won't even proceed unless you've already sold and have the cash.

> And capital controls can get tightened.

This is the main real risk that those in the scheme look out for, but it's a geopolitical risk rather than a market-based one. Which makes more sense when rates are high, like now. When rates were low, this didn't happen as much since there are plenty of clients to go around.

---

Also, in the grand scheme of things, even if the bubble bursts, the broader economy is still not worse off. Each cent paid into these mortgages is real "new money" being introduced into the economy. This is not the subprime mortgage days where at the end it became just a transfer of wealth to the banking industry. For the most part "the public" is not the one being defrauded, it's China...

[JumpCrisscross]

> while outside observers can't verify anything, those perpetrating the scheme do have to balance their own personal risk

Everyone in every corrupt scheme says this. The rule of law wins, in the long run, because these structures aren’t robust. They get perverted and subverted, and while it’s nice to imagine a bunch of competent crooks keeping up their shop, the reality is we have rules for a reason.

> it's a geopolitical risk rather than a market-based one

Capital controls aren’t geopolitical. Neither is an offshore property market bursting.

The borrowers are borrowing against an doubly-illiquid asset. Buy long, borrow short—this has been a widowmaker since antiquity.

> even if the bubble bursts, the broader economy is still not worse off

Canadian banking would collapse. You’d see the equivalent of America’s 2008 crisis, except while the rest of the world has high rates. If allowed to fester, or if it already has, that’s a generation’s quality-of-life gains going down the tube.

[jabbany]

I agree with all the points on top. The proper instrument to do this would be banks setting up a system that lets people borrow against an illiquid asset, in this case would be CNY, but it's not anything new... (and is one proposal for how to work with cryptocurrencies). That would price in the political and market risks.

---

The last one I don't agree with. This is different from the 2008 crisis in that the 2008 crisis was primarily "internal" and for the most part zero sum --- some people gained, some people lost (kind of loosely like a long-horizon pump-and-dump scheme), and at the end things revert to the original non-inflated value.

This situation is more of an encouragement of external injection _into_ the economy. Rising prices are due to external capital flowing in (and the anticipation of more to come). Even if it were to pop, things would be no worse than a hypothetical alternative timeline where there was no bubble. And that's assuming no external capital actually flowed in, that not a single person wired money into the country. Clearly this is not true, and the money coming in is still net positive. So _in aggregate_, the economy is still improved due to the injection. Again, these gains are not spread evenly, and it may be the case again that some individuals will be hurt while others reap large returns.

> a generation’s quality-of-life gains going down the tube

If anything, that just means the previous quality-of-life gains were achieved by overdrawing against the future... nothing new here.