[stefs]

still, card board boxes have no security at all; doesn't matter whether the codes were leaked or not.

there's a point to be made for expections of strong security where it's actually weak, but is no security at all really better than bad security?

[maxwell]

Cardboard boxes can be acquired without a record of their purchase and are easy to hide among other cardboard boxes, like a book in a library. Also can be used to hide from enemies while moving around under the box.

[Muromec]

It can be. If my bicycle has no lock at all, I will not leave on a outdoor parking near the central railway station, because I know for sure it will be stolen. The value here comes not from imperfect security per se, but from my ability to predict the outcome. Now if my bicycle has a meh lock, the chance of it being snatched suddenly increases.

[fluoridation]

So what are you saying? That the solution is to never prove your identity to anyone in any way?

[Muromec]

I'm saying that maybe people who chose to accept the id scan knowingly accept the risk, have a second line of checks somewhere, evaluate amount lost to fraud or fines against the cost of having full-fledged PKI and also knowingly make it your problem if their evaluation proves to be wrong.