[xgk]

Agree. The extreme secrecy of DRAM manufacturers about the innards of their chips puts an additional obstacles in the way of memory controllers (MCs) implementing efficient Rowhammer defences. In particular, if the MC doesn't know which addresses are corresponding to neighbouring rows, how can an MC know with certainty that any concrete row is being attacked? (And, to the best of my knowledge, DRAM manufacturers don't give away this information.)

[tlb]

It might be good enough to detect a large number of accesses to any single row and then initiate a complete refresh. This wouldn't be triggered often by normal software. Most exploits have to use cache flush instructions, and with modern several-way-associative caches it would be rare for normal code to trigger it accidentally. In that case, the DRAM maker just has to specify the maximum number of accesses to any row.