[chronofar]

> So, they think they are having one experience, but they are wrong about their own internal experience: in fact, they are not moving that limb because they can't.

I think it's rather the opposite, they aren't wrong about their internal experience, it's just that their internal experience doesn't match the objective reality of their body (which in this sense is external).

I think it is indeed entirely possible that our self-model can fool us about the realities of various situations, even those with our own body/emotions/etc, but I'm not sure how one could then derive the conclusion that the experience doesn't exist. It would just be instead that the experience is rather inaccurate/confabulated.

[tsimionescu]

I don't think it's correct to call this an external experience. It's an experience about will and desire and direct control of the body - what can be more internal than that?

It's not like an optical illusion, where you think you are misinterpreting an external stimulus. This is a situation where you are trying to control a limb, not getting any reply, and concluding that "you don't want to move" instead of "I can't move".

[chronofar]

The experience is internal, the body (the limb that's missing) is external to the experience. The confabulatory experience of "I don't want to move" is an internal experience and cannot itself be an illusion, it's simply an incorrect assessment of the actual state of the body.

[tsimionescu]

Sure, the limb is external. But the experience "I don't want to move" is not wrong because the limb is actually missing, it is wrong because I did actually want to move. "I" did the exact same thing as every time I try to move (i.e. the brain sent the exact same signals to the limb).

[chronofar]

Sure, none of what you said there would lead to the conclusion that the "experience is not something that really happens," though it's also possible there's a just a failure of communication here and I'm not understanding what you meant.