|
|
|
|
|
|
by pyth0
884 days ago
|
|
|
Not sure why you didn't include the remainder of that section: > As part of the bargain, however, the Crown cannot use that evidence to incriminate the witness in another proceeding. It seems important since it still prevents one from self-incrimination in the context of the courts. Maybe there are other legal ramifications caused by this distinction but it sounds functionally equivalent. |
|
|
>The Supreme Court discussed the relationship between the section 7 pre-trial right to silence and the confessions rule in Singh.90 That case involved a detained murder suspect who was interrogated by individuals he knew were police. In the course of the interrogation, Singh asserted his right to remain silent 18 times before ultimately responding to police questions with some self-incriminating statements. The defence objected to the admissibility of Singh’s statements on the basis that they were obtained in violation of his section 7 right to silence, but a slim majority of the Supreme Court rejected this argument. The majority held that, where a detainee is interrogated by known police, the section 7 right to silence is subsumed into the voluntariness inquiry.91 Since the trial judge had considered all the circumstances and determined that the statements were made voluntarily, the question whether the accused’s free will was overborne had already been answered and the section 7 right to silence could provide no further protection.92
Source(pdf): The Patchwork Principle against Self-Incrimination under the Charter https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?...