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by adnanthekhan
894 days ago
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Oh, you'll like this one then. Until 3 months ago GitHub's Runner images was pulling a package directly from Aliyun's CDN. This was executed during image testing (version check). So anyone with the ability to modify Aliyun's CDN in China could have carried out a pretty nasty attack. https://github.com/actions/runner-images/commit/6a9890362738... Now it's just anyone with write access to Aliyun's repository. :) (p.s. GitHub doesn't consider this a security issue). |
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I get it, they want to have the latest versions instead of depending on how long Ubuntu (or, worse, Debian) package maintainers take to package stuff into their mainline repositories... but creating this attack surface is nuts. Imagine being able to compromise just one of the various small tools they embed, and pivoting from there to all GitHub runners everywhere (e.g. by overwriting /bin/bash or any other popular entrypoint, or even libc itself, with a malware payload).
[1] https://github.com/actions/runner-images/tree/main/images/ub...