[adnanthekhan]

Yup! This is what makes this kind of attack scary and very unique to GitHub Actions. The baseline GITHUB_TOKEN just blows the door open on lateral movement via workflow_dispatch and and repository_dispatch events.

In several of our other operations, not just PyTorch, we leveraged workflow_dispatch to steal a PAT from another workflows. Developers tend to over-provision PATs so often. More often than not we'd end up with a PAT that has all scopes checked and org admin permissions. With that one could clean out all of the secrets from an organization in minutes using automated tools such as https://github.com/praetorian-inc/gato.

[trevyn]

To clarify, this secret stealing is not an issue with GitHub-hosted runners, correct?

[adnanthekhan]

Correct. For fork PR workflows on the pull_request trigger the GITHUB_TOKEN has read only permissions, so you can’t do anything with it.

The key thing with a non-ephemeral runner is that (after obtaining persistence) you can grab the GITHUB_TOKEN from a subsequent non-fork PR build or a build on another trigger, which will have write permissions unless restricted by the repository maintainers.