Since the MAX program was created specifically to avoid going through a full certification process, I'd say they're going to triple down. On the spectrum of MAX shenanigans, a hole blowing open in the fuselage barely ranks. The plane didn't even crash this time! And it is not yet clear that Boeing intentionally deceived the regulators; they might have paid Spirit to do it.
It's great that the FAA is looking into this. Who is looking into FAA, though? Is this another case of institutional capture?
Using a trusted and proven design (eg: 737 NG) is fine and even beneficial. In fact, reusing older designs in and of itself is fine.
The problem is Boeing clearly doesn't know how to manufacture good aircraft anymore. Whether it's a rehash or clean sheet design, the result won't change until Boeing is run through the washing machine.
Except it’s been so heavily altered that they had to use software (MCAS) to correct for the flight characteristics induced by the larger engines. And we all know how that worked out.
Yes but this is not a huge problem with the airframe itself. The tendencies without MCAS are fine. The pilots just need to be trained for them.
The problem was that airlines want to skimp on the training.
The same thing happened with the engine management. Boeing doesn't want to introduce an engine warning system because it would mean pilots have to be retrained. A lot of these barriers aren't part of the physical design but the industry as a whole being extremely wary of training. Probably as a result of cheap low-cost carriers emerging.
Not saying Boeing is a great manufacturer but it's not the only issue at play.
> ([0], scroll to bottom) Following publication, an FAA spokesman on January 11 provided the additional statement regarding Administrator Dickson’s comments around Boeing’s selected path for meeting Federal Aviation Regulations for the original implementation of MCAS on the 737 Max. The Air Current sought and received comment from the FAA in advance of publication and that is reflected in the story above. We provide the latest response in full:
> The fact of the matter is that the FAA — and the other authorities — determined during a 20-month review that MCAS was a necessary part of the flight control system. We all reviewed and approved the changes to the system as part of the recent certification.
> This is directly addressed in the 100-plus page report [1]
that was filed with the Airworthiness Directive. We made it clear that the aircraft would not have been compliant with the stick force and G requirements and higher angle-of-attack without MCAS or some other type of mechanism. The FAA does not tell applicants how to design planes, so the choice to develop MCAS was an engineering decision on the part of Boeing. The FAA’s role is to evaluate and approve proposed designs against the regulatory requirements.
I’ve just finished reading Flying Blind by Peter Robison (recommended elsewhere on HN recently), which had engineers arguing that the plane’s flight characteristics in extremis were not acceptable, and that the correct fix was by physical redesign, not software.
Another point the book made was that since nearly every other modern aircraft has far more advanced avionics, it causes the issue of pilots who are used to computers handling a lot of tasks suddenly having to do that themselves. This is probably not as much an issue with carriers who solely use 737s, like Southwest, but I can definitely see the issue otherwise.
737 MAX flies just fine so long they are manufactured properly and we stop pretending it's a 737 NG with pilots trained as such.
Y'all think 737 MAX as an airframe can't fly safely, and that's straight retarded. I sincerely believe Boeing should face bankruptcy from their many recent failings, including 737 MAX, but even I will still say 737 MAX are fine birds so long as common sense is applied.
It's great that the FAA is looking into this. Who is looking into FAA, though? Is this another case of institutional capture?