[JumpCrisscross]

> conflict is actually not far from being constrained by production

If anyone is talking about escalation risk, production isn’t the bottleneck. We are nowhere close to being resource constrained in the Middle East.

> the US Navy may find itself with insufficient stockpiles to defend itself against the PLA

In a production contest it’s maximum sustainable flows, not stocks, that matter. (Stocks buy you time to get flows up.) To the extent challenging the PLA is a concern, boosting production to counter the Houthis is a net win.

> ability to defend against credible Chinese saturation attacks is already marginal

You’re arguing both ways. If their value is marginal, expending them now is fine.

Your broader point—I think—is correct. America doesn’t want to spread itself thin. But that’s a constraint at the CVN level. Once the carrier strike force is positioned, it’s immaterial whether it’s firing off missiles or guns.

Anyone positioning Iran et al v America et al is missing key pieces in the logistics of war.

[sudosysgen]

The stocks are not sufficient to buy time to get the flows. There are only around 500 SM-6 missiles (long range, suitable to protect large numbers of vessels at various distances, 5mm$ each), and there is only capacity to produce a few hundred for the short to medium term.

The older SM-2s may have more plentiful stocks, but most of them have been deemed too dangerous to use after causing serious damage in test firings, and there are only around 180 modernized versions available, and the missile itself is no longer produced.

Defending against a saturation attack means that the value experiences a step function. Either you have enough missiles to stop most low-tech enemy missiles, and you're going to be largely fine, or you don't, and your entire fleet might sink. It's not something you can afford to. The US Navy is never going to allow stocks to go under what is necessary to stop at least a long-range Chinese attack, and that means at least 600 missiles, which is a serious chunk of what remains.

Boosting production to counter the Houthis is surely something the US will do. It will take 2-3 years to bear fruit. In the meantime, stocks are not sufficient to tank Iran's capability to produce these kinds of missiles.

I think that the most likely outcome is either more shipping companies negotiating terms to transit unharmed, like China's COSCO has all but admitted to have done, or these detours to continue.

[greedo]

I totally missed your comment about SM-2s being deemed "too dangerous" to use." That's not really accurate. There have been two incidents with the SM-2 (2015 and 2018). The USN and the German Navy decided not to do any more test firings of these missiles, but they are cleared for wartime use. And they're being used now without issue so far.

I also would love to see why you think there's only 180 modernized versions, and what you consider modernized. My understanding is that all versions have been either upgraded or their upgrade is budgeted. If you think that the USN has only 680 SM-2 and SM-6 in inventory I don't know what to say. That would be only 10 or so Standards per Arleigh Burke. There are 73 Arleigh Burkes active with a capacity of 90 missiles. Even if they only allocate 50% of these VLS slots to SM missiles, that would require over 3K missiles. And this ignores the Ticos completely. I know the USN puts to see without filling all the VLS slots, but that would be a dangerous, ridiculous loadout that I can't see escaping Congressional scrutiny.

Raytheon says they've produced over 11k SM-2 missiles worldwide. I know that testing has consumed around 3K, leaving 8K for the USN and allies. Even being generous with FMS, I doubt Raytheon has sold more than 2K overseas. That would leave the US inventory around 6K. A far cry from 180.

[greedo]

SM-2ER are the majority of Standard missiles packed on USN ships. SM-6 is really intended to replace them since it can defend against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and serve as a hypersonic ASBM. But it's expensive, so the SM-2 will soldier on, backed up by the SM-3 in the ABM role.

And the production capacity can easily be ramped up if there's enough funds.

[sudosysgen]

As far as I'm aware, new production of SM-2s has ended permanently, and all recent orders I can find are for upgrade kits, of which there's only a few hundred. Early SM-2s are limited in their ability to hit low-flying targets due to their SARH guidance.

I'm basing off on : https://apps.dtic.mil/procurement/Y2014/Navy/stamped/P40_223...

Given the production numbers, it seems that stocks even of SM-2 block 3 through 4 are at most in the low four digits.

I'm sure production capability for the SM-6 can be ramped up I'd there's enough funds, my point is that it's going to be even more expensive than the figure price of the missiles used looks like, and that it's going to be 2-3 years at least before that pans out.

[greedo]

SM-2 Block III and IIIA are designed to excel at low level targets. I didn't have time to go through all the secnav docs to see if all the USN stock has been upgraded, or funded for upgrades, but I believe so. Though I think the USN will eventually have mostly ESSM Block II and SM-6. The SM-6 is just too expensive at almost $5M per all up round. Even if production was ramped up (past the current 125 per annum), the cost is just too prohibitive for use against all but the most dire threats.

ESSM is cheaper at around $2M per round, and quad packs help increase the magazine depth on Navy ships. Production for it is also too low in my opinion, currently at roughly 140 year. Routine testing and missile qualifications could easily eat up 20% of that each year. Sigh.

I just find it hard to believe that increasing production totals wouldn't help decrease unit cost significantly. My USN friends won't mention inventory totals, but they do mention that a lot of ships are going to sea without full magazines. And since at-sea replenishment of VLS systems is still a fantasy, that's a huge issue.

[greedo]

Looks like Raytheon restarted the production line for SM-2...

https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1990XP/

[JumpCrisscross]

> US Navy is never going to allow stocks to go under what is necessary to stop at least a long-range Chinese attack, and that means at least 600 missiles

Agree.

> stocks are not sufficient to tank Iran's capability to produce these kinds of missiles

My core point is it never gets to Iran making missiles, the Houthis firing them and the U.S. doing nothing more than intercepting. Well before it becomes a production contest, the situation is resolved diplomatically or escalated.

> the most likely outcome is either more shipping companies negotiating terms to transit unharmed

This would be difficult for a Western company to do without risking sanctions.

[dragonwriter]

> My core point is it never gets to the point where Iran is making missiles, the Houthis are firing them and the U.S. is doing nothing more than intercepting them. Well before it becomes a production contest, the situation is resolved diplomatically or escalated.

Given the “final warning” issued 4 days ago by the coalition, I think escalation or resolution (probably the former) is very much a “sooner rather than later" thing.

[mlyle]

> Given the “final warning” issued 4 days ago by the coalition, I think escalation or resolution (probably the former) is very much a “sooner rather than later" thing.

Perhaps.

We have a tightrope to walk: trying not to spark a regional war but also ensuring that warnings and redlines are taken seriously.

At the same time, if your adversary knows what the response will be, they have the option of deciding the action is still worth it (or even the response would be desirable). This can even be perverse (e.g. two level games; leaders deciding to take a punch that is a net loss for their nation to rally support around themselves).

So blurry redlines --- and the full range of responses ("in a time and manner of our choosing"), including covert and deniable ones --- are employed. Ambiguity is usually advantageous to maintain, and players employ mixed strategies.