[philwelch]

The United States and South Vietnam both opposed the Khmer Rouge during the Cambodian Civil War while the North Vietnamese supported them. The split between the Vietnamese communists and the Khmer Rouge only happened after the US allowed both South Vietnam and the previous Cambodian government to fall to communists.

[qwytw]

The genocide happened in the mid to late 70s, a couple of years after the US had already withdrawn from Vietnam.

Why did the US decide to support the Khmer Rouge only after they have significantly intensified their campaign of mass murder?

[philwelch]

> The genocide happened in the mid to late 70s, a couple of years after the US had already withdrawn from Vietnam.

That’s what I said—after the United States allowed both South Vietnam and Cambodia to fall to communists. I am arguing that if the United States consistently maintained military intervention against communism in both Vietnam and Cambodia the genocide would have been prevented.

> Why did the US decide to support the Khmer Rouge

It’s not actually clear that the US did support the Khmer Rouge. But if they did, that would have been wrong, just like abandoning South Vietnam and the pre-Khmer Rouge government of Cambodia was wrong. The US has wrongly supported many communist regimes, including those of China and the Soviet Union, and would have been better served with a consistent anticommunist foreign policy at almost any point in history.

[qwytw]

> Cambodia the genocide would have been prevented

It's not like the US or the UN were particularly bothered by mass massacres of civilians in South Korea, so it's doubtful that really was a significant concern. At the time, the non-communist regimes they were propping up in Korea or Vietnam were hardly any less brutal than their communist opponents as far as human rights are concerned (of course I'm not talking about the Khmer Rouge).

> It’s not actually clear that the US did support the Khmer Rouge

Well they together with China did support them in the UN at least. Which effectively was an endorsement of the genocide.

> intervention against communism in both Vietnam

Geopolitically it would have made perfect sense for the US to back the reunification of Vietnam under a socialist/moderately communist regime. The USSR had limited ability to project power in the region (unlike in Korea) and Vietnam would've certainly sided with the US instead instead of China despite the ideological differences.

Instead the US choose to back France in their desperate and and entirely pointless colonial war. After that.. well they had no choice.

> and would have been better served with a consistent anticommunist foreign policy at almost any point in history.

What do you think US could've done different in Vietnam (besides directly invading the north)? Not a rhetorical question, I'm genuinely curious because to me that was seemed pretty hopeless.

[philwelch]

> At the time, the non-communist regimes they were propping up in Korea or Vietnam were hardly any less brutal than their communist opponents as far as human rights are concerned (of course I'm not talking about the Khmer Rouge).

Tell that to the hundreds of thousands of refugees who fled South Vietnam, or the massive crowds in Saigon begging the Americans to bring them or at least their children along as they evacuated the US embassy by helicopter.

> Geopolitically it would have made perfect sense for the US to back the reunification of Vietnam under a socialist/moderately communist regime. The USSR had limited ability to project power in the region (unlike in Korea) and Vietnam would've certainly sided with the US instead instead of China despite the ideological differences.

Vietnam sided with the USSR over China; their split with the Khmer Rouge was largely a proxy for the broader Sino-Soviet split. Nixon and Kissinger, along with their mistaken policy of pulling out of Vietnam, also adopted a mistaken policy of trying to cozy up with Communist China to try and widen and exploit this split. Our relatively good relations with Vietnam today are largely a consequence of the Soviets not being around anymore and China emerging as a major threat, both of which were largely unforeseen in the 1970’s.

The Carter administration actually adopted a policy very similar to what you recommend, of withholding support for authoritarian regimes otherwise friendly to the US who faced too much popular resistance. It didn’t work out well for reasons Jeane Kirkpatrick explained very clearly at the time: https://web.archive.org/web/20110228072902/http://www.commen...

> What do you think US could've done different in Vietnam (besides directly invading the north)? Not a rhetorical question, I'm genuinely curious because to me that was seemed pretty hopeless.

It might have seemed hopeless, but we were losing the propaganda war much more than we were losing the actual war on the ground. The Tet Offensive was a huge military disaster for the communists but got spun and misrepresented as a disaster for the US. This isn’t to say that there weren’t blunders on the part of the US—McNamara was one of the worst SecDefs we’ve ever had—but despite that, we were still winning.

Back in the Civil War, the South’s basic theory was that, while they could never beat the North in a straight up fight, maybe they could make the war so long and bloody and miserable that eventually the North would get tired of the war and lose its resolve. And to the South’s credit, the war was long and bloody and miserable. The Union made plenty of blunders. Some of the bloodiest days of American history were the days when rebel incursions into the North were repulsed at Antietam and Gettysburg. The reason Lincoln won where LBJ lost is because Lincoln was able to politically outmaneuver the rebels and their Copperhead allies in the North. Some of the methods Lincoln used to do that were admittedly extreme, but I’m not convinced Johnson would have had to go to the same extremes.

War is hard. Unless you win the entire war in a month or two, it’s always going to be easy to spin things and make it look as if the war is going badly. This problem gets worse as communication gets faster and attention spans get shorter. Vietnam seemed worse than it was because the government wasn’t prepared to fight a war in the age of color television. Britain had similar challenges fighting the Crimean War during the age of the telegraph, and the US struggled to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan during the eras of 24 hour cable news and social media. (Which is not a statement in defense of those wars, but rather a statement about the challenges of operating in a new media environment).

[somenameforme]

I'd challenge this argument in regards to Vietnam. I don't think the issue is that war is hard, but rather that we keep trying to attack motivated local populations. I'm sure you're aware of the old quote that, to my knowledge, originated during the Civil War about it being "a rich man's war, and a poor man's fight." And that was absolutely true. Without conscription (which the elites were of course able to sidestep), it would have been a far less brutal war. It was people who didn't want to be fighting, fighting against people who didn't want to be fighting.

In general when fighting an enemy does not want to be fighting but is being compelled to do so, I think that opens the door to a real and meaningful victory. But when you're fighting against groups of people, often with a very flat organizational structure, who blend seamlessly with the local population (in no small part because they are the local population), and who want to be fighting you? I think victory there is near to impossible.

This is how Afghanistan, a country with the GDP of a mid-sized town in a modern nation, has defeated not only the USA but also the USSR. In terms of results, they are the most powerful fighting force in the world. But the issue when fighting them is that you don't know who you're fighting. This makes ground operations near to impossible, and sends civilian casualties skyrocketing, which creates even more motivated fighters. You kill one Taliban and create 3 more.

And furthermore, these people aren't going anywhere because it's their home. For them, the conflict is a matter of their very existence. They'll fight you for decades until they die, then their children will fight you, and so on endlessly. By contrast, we're fighting with motivations like trying to avoid geopolitical embarrassment, literally. One of the leaks in the Pentagon Papers included a memo laying out our motivations. And the primary motivation, at 70%, was "To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor)." [1]

Even if you imagine America somehow was able to "win" in Vietnam, you end up with an Afghanistan issue. What now? You can't just maintain millions of soldiers there indefinitely. And if the people you support are only able to stay in power because of those millions of soldiers, then it may turn out that the "war" you just won was merely a battle in in the real "war."

[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentagon_Papers#Impact

[philwelch]

> I don't think the issue is that war is hard, but rather that we keep trying to attack motivated local populations.

The local population of South Vietnam, for the most part, did not want to be conquered by the communists, did not rise up against the South Vietnamese government during the Tet Offensive as the communists expected them to, and were, in fact, brutally conquered and suppressed by the communist armies that invaded them from the north after the United States abandoned them. Why do you think so many of them became refugees? These people were our allies and we abandoned them.

You’re providing a perfect example of how the United States lost a propaganda war that had, at best, an extremely loose relationship with the reality on the ground.

And the exact same thing happened in Afghanistan. The level of American presence and support for the Afghan government was minimal and would have been easily sustainable, and it had been years since a single American casualty had been suffered. The withdrawal was a completely unforced error that left billions of dollars in weapons, thousands of Afghan translators, and the biometric data to identify them all in the hands of the Taliban. It was an absolute disgrace.