The 8s and 9s have the exact same issue and the FAA already approved the exact mitigation in those aircraft. Having different fixes for the same issue is more deviance, not less.
This is exactly how normalization of deviance leads to death.
The MAX8 does not have a fix, it has a complicated checklist of workarounds for dynamic behaviors that should be automated.
Then the next level of failure you're inducing is that ' 8 = 7 '.
The combined systems of the MAX8 are not and do not equal the combined systems of the MAX7. You have re-asses the mitigation on every airframe that differs or you end up with a field of people splattered everywhere. If Boeing actually does the reassessment as they should, it will be about as intensive as actually removing the issue and reducing the workload of the pilot in the first place.
That's why a lot of people are pissy about this, as Boeing is trying to say they did it once and that work transfers to a new system perfectly. Didn't work so well with the other MAX8's that splattered themselves.
Pretty sure two wrongs don't make a right.
The unsafe planes should definitely be grounded but that would be expensive.
Just because we screwed up before, and exempted planes, doesn't mean we should knowingly continue to ignore danger.
There’s no “two wrongs” here, per the FAA. There was one wrong (the issue) and then that issue is mitigated by a procedure (the issue is righted, at least partially).
Even if you disagree with this mitigation, every time a new MAX 8 rolls off the production line and enters service, the problem grows larger. Why is this okay, but not with the same for a MAX 7?
Again: either the mitigation is effective enough for MAX variants, or it’s not. I see no reason the two variants should be treated differently here.
>Again: either the mitigation is effective enough for MAX variants, or it’s not
No it is not. Here, you are doing just the normalization of deviance I'm talking about.
An airplane is parts, and an airplane is a system. Just because you use part X in system 1 doesn't mean a mitigation strategy for part X works the same in system 2. For example system 2 (or the MAX 7 in this case) could also have an addition dysfunction in cold weather that by itself is low risk, but when coupled with this procedure now represent a significantly higher risk of loss of aircraft event.
This is the the kind of problem that shows up in new/changed systems when accepting risk from previous systems at their previously measured outcomes.
And exception is a deviance that must be tracked and taken care of adding mental load to the list of things a pilot has to do.
The normalization is pushing this deviance into a new system that isn't complete and therefore has no refit requirement over a large base of aircraft.