[taeric]

I think the catch there is that your "login endpoint" is still relying on the user's browser to get the code. The cognito endpoint returns a redirect to the user, and it is on them to follow it. So, the "code=foo" is visible to the user. If the user wants, they can try to prevent following the redirect and use that code directly.

That is, between each of your bullet points, there is a request by the user's browser. You do a request to the cognito hosted UI, it returns a code to the browser through a redirect to a webpage that is in it's "allowed list." The idea is that your "allowed list" includes a "login endpoint," but in all cases the code goes back to the user and it is on their browser to send that to the specified page.

I'm asserting that you can have javascript in the main web app that can use the "fetch" api in the browser to exchange a code for a token. That mostly hides it from accidental disclosure. And it makes it so that you don't have to have a special HTTP endpoint with another redirect in there setting cookies. (I'm assuming you'd set local storage or cookies with the fetch data.)

Right? Does that make sense?

[opportune]

Yes, the user can still share their access code if they really want to. That’s like them sharing their password.

What I’m trying to prevent, while adhering to general authN best practices, is a user accidentally or unknowingly sharing their access code because they copied the address in their browser bar/history and sent it to someone. If they jump through hoops to share it there is nothing I can do to stop it. But the default Cognito footgun I’m mentioning is that the code ends up in their browser window in a way that could be easily copy and pasted without them knowing why they shouldn’t do that.

[taeric]

Makes sense, I think.

I don't think you need another endpoint that will respond with cookie commands?

On your page, the one that got the "?code=foo" payload, you can use javascript on your site and make another call to the backend to get the tokens. The same javascript code should clear the URL so that a naive copy/paste doesn't get it.

This is in contrast to having another server side endpoint that can set cookies on another http redirect response to the user. One that has to be in the same domain as your application, for the cookie to set correctly.

This will leak the "code=foo" in any access logs surrounding the user. But, that is already in the user's history and already happened. Is why cognito goes out of their way to make "foo" one-time use.