[lexh]

“pretty scary stuff” indeed!

This would inevitably end up ingesting secrets, right? Like say from my password manager? Or API keys in my terminal?

Lots of ways for this to go sideways even if the data stays local.

What’s the plan there?

[jasonjmcghee]

Come together as a community and help build the right thing. This isn’t the first implementation and I don’t have a fiduciary duty to create value to investors.

[cjbprime]

> Lots of ways for this to go sideways even if the data stays local.

Could you name some?

[lexh]

The impression I was left with is that this tool would write things to disk. It would be helpful to know how that data is stored. I wouldn’t want my password manager OCR’d and then sitting in plain text on disk for example.

[Bombinator]

> Like say from my password manager? Or API keys in my terminal?

[cjbprime]

That's not describing a bad outcome, it's describing how the tool works.

[Bombinator]

Oh, well I think what he meant is that some malicious program could read and transmit this unencrypted recorded data which is normally stored in an encrypted form

[cjbprime]

Thanks, I think so too, but the threat model is a bit odd. On a Mac, potentially malicious programs do not normally have access to files in every location (e.g. the prompts to allow a process to access your Documents dir); there is hardware-backed crypto available for further protections; full disk encryption; and so on. It's unclear to me how to evaluate the severity of the risk.

Every security decision is a risk-reward tradeoff, and the reward of a complete memory of computing tasks seems pretty huge.