[cornholio]

The typical standards process is an adaptation to a world where patents exist. It tries to clearly determine what patents are required to build a technology, and will typically lump them up into a patent pool available for a nominal licensing fee. Participants are strongly incentivized to disclose any essential patents they hold and include them in the pool, so as a standards implementer you know that once you pay the fee, nobody will sue you.

The alternative - again, in the same real world where patents exist - is to craft a very fragile standard around the patents that you know of, without the participation of the industry, only to be whacked with a submarine patent as soon as the standard becomes dominant and can't - in the legal opinion of the "inventor" - be implemented without their innovative brainberry. That can still happen within the previous workflow, but at least you involve early on most holders of IP related to that field.

Of course, none of this precludes the notion that a better world is possible, say one where any inventor has to prove substantial investment before patentability (say, medical studies and drug approval), and can only recoup those investments up to a limited multiplier.

[rocqua]

That is a part of the process I hadn't considered. I was looking at the incentive of participants to have their patents in the standard. But it makes total sense that everyone who will implement the standard (which tends to involve the participants) wants no surprises around patents.