[bonzini]

Yes, and the policy of QEMU is to not assign CVEs for bugs that would generally be hit only when QEMU is used as a development platform, as opposed to using it to offer virtualization services.

https://www.qemu.org/contribute/security-process/

We are colleagues by the way. :)

[worthless-trash]

> We are colleagues by the way. :)

I'm aware, I see you comment here regularly.

QEMU doesn't have to assign CVE's but any other CNA can. I do not believe that its good security or even good practice to negotiate out of exploitable flaws. Its a dis-service to users.

I don't have enough skin in the game to change upstream QEMU's mind on this, systems in exploitable configurations are just as exploitable with or without a CVE assigned. People with exploitable configurations now just can't find out there is a problem.

[bonzini]

The question is whether something is exploitable or just a crash. It is also a disservice to user to worry them about having to do an immediate update and evacuation of all hosts because of an out of bounds access in Gravis Ultrasound emulation.

Would any crash in GCC be a vulnerability because compilers are fed untrusted source code? Perhaps, but in practice godbolt.org is going to be the only case in which you care.

[worthless-trash]

Crashes are classifed as a denial of service, which is CVE. Imagine how mad any cloud host would be if they found you could crash the host from the guest.

> Would any crash in GCC be a vulnerability because compilers are fed untrusted

> source code? Perhaps, but in practice godbolt.org is going to be the only

> case in which you care.

"Untrusted" is one those other fine lines that makes assigning and rating difficult and not something that is taken lightly. Compiling software as a user with additional capabilities, could escalate an attackers position assuming they can inject code into the tree to be built. It would be easier to abuse 'make' to execute code, however this is different than the qemu use case.

The QMEU "development" case could (and likely is) someones regular runtime use case. I dont see a clean way for the qmeu team to communicate this, and even if they did, privesc is privsec. Until we as an industry have a clear definition of what we will and wont "support" and users are familiar with the expectations, we're stuck with the hand we've been dealt.

Hopefully that all makes sense, none of it is said to antagonise or draw hate.

[bonzini]

Crashing the host kernel is DoS. Crashing QEMU from the guest is bad because a use-after-free could be a possible avenue for privesc. But if an assertion failure can be triggered from the guest kernel, in the end it's just another way for a virtual machine to terminate itself. It sucks but it is not security sensitive.