The build steps are provided as a GitHub action in the repo. You can audit the build pretty easily, or if you're super paranoid you can build it yourself by following the build steps.
Even if the app is trustworthy, it still adds an attack vector to your system. It could have a bug, or the certificate could be exploited by another program.
It's in no way worse than running a single browser extension with overly broad privileges. If this method of adblocking gains more traction (quite possible, as Google keeps moving to damage in-browser ad blockers), I expect the implementation to receive a lot more scrutiny.
I think we have to face the reality that web browsers might no longer be considered "user" agents.
> I think we have to face the reality that web browsers might no longer be considered "user" agents.
I think too many techies are, much like yourself, contributing to the problem by refusing to move away from Chrome for "reasons"[1], and then compounding it by refusing to acknowledge that "web browsers" != "Google Chrome".
[1] The "reasons" are of dubious quality. Myself and many others are able to do all normal web-browsing from firefox or firefox forks with no functional or performance degradation.
> I think too many techies are, much like yourself, contributing to the problem by refusing to move away from Chrome [...]
Contrary to your assumptions, I've been quite vocal against the Chrome/Blink monoculture for a while. Unfortunately there is a legit case for it; several generations of "low-end" devices (anything older than 10 years basically), that are still quite capable and in common use, where the difference in performance between Firefox and Chromium becomes quite noticeable, especially as you try to watch video.
I don't think the problem is "techies", we have zero influence outside our own circles - see the historical rates of Linux adoption. The problem is we need the good ol' hammer of antitrust to start swinging again. We also need the regulators to be smart; if we get really unlucky, they will target iOS Safari instead. (This would be good in a healthy ecosystem, but would only serve to further entrench Google's position in the current situation.)
By the way, using a filtering/rewriting proxy has other merits, especially on said older hardware; you can rewrite the entire web page to make it more lightweight and accessible. Check out miniwebproxy[1] and medium-rare[2]. It's also quite simple to write one; you need maybe a hundred lines of Go to start getting results. I've been experimenting with integrating Readability[3][4]; and I think there's more potential to this approach.
> I think we have to face the reality that web browsers might no longer be considered "user" agents.
If by "web browsers" you mean specifically Chrome, yes. Firefox, Brave, and others are all committed to supporting MV2, and will continue to serve my interests as a user for the foreseeable future.
I think it is a mistake for programs that have SSL traffic to not have an option for a user-defined non-secure proxy (usually this would be for a proxy running on the local computer, rather than a remote proxy). A non-secure proxy would save energy (since then it doesn't need to decrypt and encrypt it twice) as well as allowing use of newer (or older) cipher methods in programs that do not support them.
How do you know that the downloaded binaries are built by the GitHub action? If I must audit the code and build it myself every release, then how is this a usable product?
Not a product. It's literally free, free as in free speech, and free as in you're free not to use it.
Building the code yourself for every update is also a solved problem on every system with a feature complete package manager, including Windows. Trust is not so easily solvable, but if you trust nobody, you can choose to look at ads.
Same as everything you use on your computer... If it's not open source it's already game over. If it is, congratulations feel free to inspect all the code yourself and build from source OR trust the project maintainers and use pre built binaries.
Applies to this program no different than your Linux distro.
Of course there could be other tools that can help verify things such as checksums on reproducible builds.
If none of that is "usable" enough for you, feel free to set up your own tooling and automation
Thank you. That's my point. There is no point in stating that some open source code is somewhat safer because "it can be audited". No. As you said, it's the same as everything I use on my computer. Unless we can establish a consistent safety level for certain type of projects, we can't claim an arbitrary category of software is somehow better.
In fact, that's what I'm trying to say. The line we draw at "hey we can at least audit open source" is a fully imaginary one. It's a false comfort we create. It's the Kool-Aid we drink.
I don't have any trust in any of those components you mentioned, but I came to terms with the risks associated with using them as part of my threat model. However, I find the notion that open source is somewhat safer because "we can audit it" exaggerating if not misleading. It's not a valid argument, and it should never be used because there's no way to do it in an either practical or consistent way for the users of the said product.
There's a difference between "you/I can audit it" and "we (collectively) can audit it".
You're not living in a vacuum. The more users (and perhaps more importantly, contributors) an open source product has, the less likely it has intentional backdoors built into it.
Yes that's fair, however that's how our complex world works. E.g. we rely on journalism (the real kind) to uncover all kind of scummy behavior. Similar in the OSS world.
There is no way to easily verify that unless some trusted bodies do this for us and publish their work specifically for what you're using.
Now you just have been stating a problem and no solution.
I do agree with you though that "hey it's OSS and easy to verify because we have the code" is indeed lying to ourselves and especially tools with privileges like this (MITM your encrypted traffic) should not be taken that lightly and have the proper warnings, disclaimer and attention (to watch for bad behavior)