> a very specific environment (iran nuclear plant)
Stuxnet was a full stack of plugins (which lends huge weight toward the early "big team" design and build theories of first observers).
There was a payload intended for very specific centrifuges ... and there was replication toward target logic ( Farsi language | locale seeking targets for copying ) IIRC.
The "work" of Stuxnet wasn't limited to screwing up the centrifuges, it also had seeking and limited comms.
To add onto that, the public infection was meant as a smoke screen to provide cover for the CIA setting up a fake business to enter the nuclear facility and installing it via USB. I’m not sure what kind of value the smoke screen created. Maybe created some confusion in Iranian intelligence services as to how stuxnet invaded? But ultimately knowledge of infection was counter productive as stuxnet was design to subtly change the control parameters so that the system would get damaged in a hard to detect way (spinning centrifuges slightly faster than they should have if I recall correctly)
... its way towards ...
> a very specific environment (iran nuclear plant)
Stuxnet was a full stack of plugins (which lends huge weight toward the early "big team" design and build theories of first observers).
There was a payload intended for very specific centrifuges ... and there was replication toward target logic ( Farsi language | locale seeking targets for copying ) IIRC.
The "work" of Stuxnet wasn't limited to screwing up the centrifuges, it also had seeking and limited comms.