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by hef19898 943 days ago
Just found another highlight from the executive summary:

>> Prior to the earthquake, the Japan Trench was categorized as a subduction zone with a frequent occurrence of magnitude 8 class earthquakes; an earthquake of magnitude 9.0 off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture was not considered to be credible by Japanese scientists. However, similar or higher magnitudes had been registered in different areas in similar tectonic environments in the past few decades.

Now, tell me again, how the Fukushima earthquake and tsunami were totally impossible to predict events?

And it gets better:

>> In addition, a number of trial calculations were performed by the operator before the accident, using wave source models or methodologies that went beyond the consensus based methodology. Thus, a trial calculation using the source model proposed by the Japanese Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion in 2002, which used the latest information and took a different approach in its scenarios, envisaged a substantially larger tsunami than that provided for in the original design and in estimates made in previous reassessments. At the time of the accident, further evaluations were being conducted, but in the meantime, no additional compensatory measures were implemented. The estimated values were similar to the flood levels recorded in March 2011.

So, in 2002 they predicted pretry accurately the strength of potentail tsunamis. And then they did nothing for next nine years. The USSR knew about the control rod issue of RBMKs, and as TEPCO in Japan, did nothing until Chernobyl. See the inherent risk of nuclear power here? Because both, Chernobyl and Fukushima were pretty much predictable (as the risk was prpoerly identified before both accidents) and preventable if people in charge, and the organizations, would have put counter measures in place.

Edit: And now you can google the material difference between common and special causes.

>> The common cause failures of multiple safety systems resulted in plant conditions that were not envisaged in the design.