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by kibwen 958 days ago
The problem with predictions markets is that they incentivize participants to distort the market in order to make their prediction come true (and thus receive a payout). It quickly stops being a place to gauge the likelihood of an event, and turns into a roundabout contract bidding mechanism, the most famous example being "the likelihood that so-and-so famous politician will be dead by next year" is just an anonymized assassination contract. There's a reason that insider trading is illegal; prediction markets are inordinately susceptible to Goodhart's Law.
4 comments

Goodhart's Law for those who don't remember: any measure used as a performance target ceases to become a good measure.

Or put another way: when people can maximize their profit by manipulating the measurement or market at least some of them will attempt to do so.

Stock markets are more difficult (but far from impossible) to control. To make Target's numbers come in low you'd have to suppress their retail sales or their supply chain. Whereas who wins X Race is a singular event that only requires one person (in the most optimistic case) to participate thereby controlling the outcome. In a sense a lot of what prediction markets make book on amounts to penny stocks and are just as risky. If you want to make such markets widely available you need regulation on what kind of events allow bets and strict rules against insider trading (eg sports participants and their families must be prohibited from participating).

Insider trading is illegal because the non-insiders would stop trading otherwise.

Prediction markets have some problems but this isn't the biggest one. One can even use it for good. If a company gives its associates stocks but prevents them to sell for some time, this is essentially the same mechanism.

For example, we could make prediction markets about upcoming policy and laws and their impact. Then we can tell the policy makers to bet that their proposed changes actually have the good outcomes they promise.

> Insider trading is illegal because the non-insiders would stop trading otherwise.

This is completely, demonstrably false; there are no insider trading laws in rel estate, commodities or crypto, but that doesn't stop people buying.

Real estate sort of has insider trading laws, but in the opposite direction. If you know your building has a defect, you have to disclose it to any potential buyers. It's not exactly the same as a ban on insider trading, but it basically prevents the sort of insider trading where you know something bad is going to happen and so you dump the stock. Also there's a technical point: "insider" has a specific meaning (ie. an employee having material non public information). For real estate, commodities or crypto, it basically doesn't exist.
Not so, I would just buy whatever the insiders are buying a bit later. The argument against insider trading is a bit weak because it seems impossible to enforce effectively and I don't see why anyone would assume insiders are anything but active in the market.

Picking on stocks as an example, there is a background fair market rate that everything should theoretically achieve. Insiders way outperform that - but most people are in the market to target the background rate, not the outlier rate insider traders can achieve.

My favorite part of insider trading is that it only punishes those who take action. You buy or sell. If you have insider information that prevents you from buying or selling, that’s just fine (at least that is my understanding).
If everyone bought whatever the insiders were buying there would be no one to take the other side.
>The problem with predictions markets is that they incentivize participants to distort the market in order to make their prediction come true (and thus receive a payout)

As opposed to the stock market?

>There's a reason that insider trading is illegal; prediction markets are inordinately susceptible to Goodhart's Law.

Insider trading is only illegal because you're abusing your position of trust as an employee. You having an incentive to make the stock go higher is totally fine. In fact that's how activist investing works. You buy shares in a company, use that to get control and turn the company around, and sell your shares in the now more valuable company.

Not opposed. In addition.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39664212.amp

The reason governments finally have gone hardball on crypto was the realization that it created an incentive for people to bet against and ultimately attack the shared economic system.

Silicon Valley bank run triggered by investors with well known crypto exposure was only the final straw

yes, as opposed to the stock market; if i go buy AAPL calls, i can’t expect to manipulate apple’s share price by, say, buying a bunch of iphones.

conversely, i can’t buy puts, hoping that my stock sell off will effect them being in the money at expiry.

something something market forces and what not, but the long and short of it (no pun intended) is that.. if it were profitable, people would be doing it.

insider trading is illegal for numerous reasons, “abuse of trust” isn’t wrong, it’s just wholly incomplete.

>yes, as opposed to the stock market; if i go buy AAPL calls, i can’t expect to manipulate apple’s share price by, say, buying a bunch of iphones.

Did you miss my entire paragraph on activist investors? The only difference between them and you is that they're putting way more effort into it.

>insider trading is illegal for numerous reasons, “abuse of trust” isn’t wrong, it’s just wholly incomplete.

That's the canonical reason, at least in us securities law. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insider_trading#United_States_...

In theory the same thing is true with horse race betting; you can just assassinate the horse. Or the jockey. Or if you want to be more subtle about it, just slip something into the horse feed. But this doesn't really happen in practice.
Match fixing happens regularly, so regularly that we have the term "match fixing" with a Wikipedia article dedicated to it. The presumption that match fixing doesn't happen in practice is unfounded.

Here, from two months ago: "Over 180 professional tennis players participated in a global match-fixing ring" https://www.npr.org/2023/09/10/1198675541/over-180-professio...

OK, fair; a stronger argument is "it doesn't happen enough that we need to shut down horse racing". Or tennis betting, in your case.
It's a question of scale. A few horses aren't a big deal, and both sides (the horse racing, and the bet) are heavily constrained in scope. Both sides become far less constrained with prediction markets.

Maybe if we were objective, horse betting should be shut down -- but we kinda don't care.

Match-fixing likely has just become part of the game and the odds.
Which comes back around to the original comment: the existence of a predictions market influences the outcome of the event being predicted, and in the worst case this effect is so large that it completely invalidates the purpose of attempting to predict the outcome in the first place; the tail wags the dog.
A quick Google search shows a number of accusations of poisoning horses: https://www.espn.com/moresports/news/2003/0709/1578661.html https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/06/21/dressage-poisoni...

Plus apparently a huge amount of drugs given to their own horses trying to cheat.

OK, fair, but it doesn't happen near enough to the degree that we'd need to shut down horse race betting.
horse racing is one of those things that 'tech people' generally does not keep tabs on