[thurn]

Dr. Alex Wellerstein has a lot of great writing on this subject on his blog and on the /r/askhistorians subreddit under the username 'restricteddata'.

    The way I see the field these days is a lot of hovering around a "middle" position on the bombs, as opposed to the extreme "ends" of the spectrum ("totally justified, best decision ever" vs. "terrible war crime done just to look tough"). The authors you are quoting, like Zinn (and Kuznik, who is also quoted by another response), are I think pretty anomalous in that they still stake out a hard, confident position on one end of the spectrum. (There are a few who stake out the other end, too.) The "middle" position, what the historian J. Samuel Walker calls "the consensus view", basically says that the bombs were seen as a perfectly fine, if not a little unusual, military decision, that they might not have been solely responsible for the surrender of Japan, and that the use of the bombs in the way they were used (on cities, little spacing, early August) was a mixture of vaguely strategic thinking (no "grand plan" on anyone's part, but people did have some ideas about what you might get out of doing it that way) and complete happenstance (the spacing between the bombs, and the fact that they had two ready to go in early August, depended on external factors that had nothing to do with real strategy).

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/3zuffw/some_... has a detailed discussion of the issue.