[traverseda]

You can probably build a rig to feed false data to the sensor, or take a photo of a sufficiently high-resolution display, or use side-channel power analysis to extract the cryptographic keys. I have serious doubts this kind of provenance metadata will actually work against a sophisticated attacker (someone willing to spend more than 100k on making fake images), but I'm sure it will be used as an excuse to further lock down computing platforms.

[generj]

There are probably many possible methods to detect a picture being of a display rather than the real world. The easiest clues are depth of field and focal length metadata mismatching (presumably a macro lens or similar would be needed, and also presuming lens metadata is not spoofable and included in the signed metadata). Color accuracy will be subtly off. Cameras can detect more dynamic range depth than most (any) screens can create particularly for outdoor scenes. That’s just what I can come up with right now - scientists will have a field day publishing techniques to detect pictures of screens.

Inserting fake sensor readings is plausible but complicated enough I doubt any but state actors would or could bother.

Even this standard only raises the cost to create fake images to 100K would be fantastic for journalism and democracy. Much better than the cost being $0.

[jychang]

Typical tech response that ignores the realityy of users: Most leica lenses predate electronics. Lol.

What DoF/focal length metadata?

[illwrks]

This is probably useful in a legal context more than anything else. Imagine photos presented as evidence in court... photos taken with a known 'approved' device, with trusted credentials and a way to prove the photos came from said device. I'm sure there are large government contracts for such a device.

[M95D]

> feed false data to the sensor

Then why not replace the sensor entirely and send fake sensor data? It would be difficult to fake depth of field changes in response to camera's focus motor moving. If I were a security researcher, I would really try to see if the camera is smart enough to tell if the sensor data is fake.

> take a photo of a sufficiently high-resolution display

A 60 MP display? (10000x6000 resolution? I want one!!!) That would still make pixels visible. I suspect a display at least 4x larger would be needed. And it needs to be curved, or the out-of-focus corners will ruin the illusion.

[M95D]

I was wrong about the curved display and focus. Sorry.

[great_psy]

I think each camera has its own key. So to do any side channel attack you would need to steal the camera, in which case you can just take a picture of a printout in a lab and then it’s all signed by the camera.

The signature just says who took the picture, not that the image is not ai generated.

[roomey]

Raising the bar of fakes is probably the goal with this