[uoaei]

Everyone who does serious work on consciousness defines it that way.

It's only naive, over-confident people jumping into conversations they don't understand who define it as something else.

We can also talk about cognitive abilities, sentience, etc., but these are distinct concepts from consciousness and it's extremely valuable to maintain that distinction if you want to have productive discussions.

[the_gipsy]

> Everyone who does serious work on consciousness defines it that way.

What? As "experiencing bits of data"? That's ridiculous, a stone experiences bits of data as scratches on its surface. You could say that it "experiences its environment", but that's semantics and has almost nothing to do with human consciousness - or at least with the interesting parts of it.

[uoaei]

Experience as phenomenological subjective experience. I.e., to experience "the color yellow" rather than just the physiochemical processes associated with incidence of photons of a particular wavelength, or "sour" rather than just interacting with certain kinds of acids.

Philosophy of mind scholars have been very consistent about this for the longest time. I would recommend reading some of the literature they have produced to become more acquainted.

However "interesting parts of human consciousness" as you put it are still outside the realm of consciousness per se, and can be more adequately described as "cognition", "awareness", "agency", "sentience", etc. Each concept is distinct (but related) from the others and it's unproductive at this point in our collective development of theory and study to lump them all under a single umbrella term.

Consciousness is a relatively boring question when limited to this definition, but that just means you need to change your language to remain comprehensible, not to redefine words that already have very precise meanings.

I can give you my personal thoughts on the matter, they may align more closely to yours than you may initially assume. As a quick note, complex systems are interesting primarily because they encode features of their environment in their physical makeup, kind of like your rock example. Rocks can't really "do" anything with that information except roll and crack differently than if they didn't have those scratches, but when you really drill down into this phenomenon, there's no bright line between the encoding of scratches on rock surfaces and slightly more complicated systems like river deltas changing the path of water in response to upstream flows (a kind of analog computer encoding the history of its "experiences") or even more complicated systems like lineages of organisms encoding their experiences in DNA via natural selection based on the history of its (the lineage -- not each individual organism) interaction with its 4D environment. None of this really has anything to say about what rocks or river deltas or organisms or whole lineages are experiencing according to the definition of consciousness above, and it seems impossible to access any kind of scientific evidence one way or the other, which is most of the reason that scholars (Chalmers) came up with the "hard problem of consciousness" to at least acknowledge and refine the difficult questions still facing us in this field of study.