[atoav]

> Disadvantage is that you have to enter password each time you push/pull.

Run ssh-add in your terminal session before doing your push/pull dance — this way you only have to enter the password once. This gives you the security of the password protected key without bothering you too much in practise.

If you need to pull on a remote that doesn't have your private keys (as is good and proper) you can run ssh -A [e-mail] to take that identity with you onto that remote (e.g. so you are able to pus/pull from there).

[vindex10]

thanks for the suggestion. I haven't used agent forwarding myself. I read a bit in the manual, and this seems to have a problem if the users I'm sharing the machine with have `sudo`:

> Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's UNIX-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. A safer alternative may be to use a jump host (see -J).

> Run ssh-add in your terminal session before doing your push/pull dance

originally my comment was about gpg encrypted files. also I suspect any kind of agent would expose privileges of my key to others if they have sudo.

[atoav]

Exactly. This should be used with care on remote hosts that are untrusted.

But for local development it is still superior to not having a password at all.

[vindex10]

for local development, I use keychain [1] on top of the ssh-agent.

this allows to keep ssh-agent On for a limited time, so it will ask for password again in, for example, 10 minutes.

[1] https://www.funtoo.org/Funtoo:Keychain