[izacus]

Just a note from the sites FAQ: the data is actually showing places where airplanes report LOW NAVIGATION ACCURACY via their ADS-B transponders.

Since planes tend to default to INS navigation with use GPS, GLONASS, Galileo or other systems to supplement the drift, it may be subject to certain data skew (e.g. if there's an area on the world where most planes aren't equipped with GPS navigation system, have poor quality navigation tech or you might be seeing "jamming" where there might just be a common place on airline route where INS drifts).

[bragr]

To pile on about what this actually shows, further the data is sourced from ADSB Exchange so there's only data in areas where there are sufficient participants, and skews coverage towards Europe and North America

https://map.adsbexchange.com/mlat-map/

[toomuchtodo]

Project owner might be able to add data from stationary GNSS reference stations to improve global coverage of positioning accuracy available.

https://geodesy.noaa.gov/CORS/

https://epncb.oma.be/

[jjwiseman]

You're saying aircraft are reporting position based on their INS? That seems… weird. I've also been told the opposite, that ADS-B navigation accuracy is always reported based on GNSS, not INS. What's your source?

I hope this doesn't confuse the issue, because I don't think it's actually related to what you're talking about, but recently there have been reports of inertial nav systems being "corrupted", essentially, by spoofed GNSS. The hypothesis is that the INS/IRS is corrected using spoofed GNSS data after which the INS/IRS reports bad info: https://ops.group/blog/faa-warning-navigation-failures/

[izacus]

Err, yeah - the airliners still mostly use INS for their navigation (with corrections, either manual or automatic, depending on equipment and age), but ADS-B indeed needs to report its location from a GNSS "High-integrity position source". So scratch the INS part.

[lxgr]

Pure INS should be pretty rare these days, no?

I believe it's now usually a combination of multiple sources (e.g. ground-based navaids like VORs and DMEs, GNSSs/GPS, and INS to reject most spoofed signals or in case everything else fails).

[izacus]

Not sure what do you mean with "pure" INS. Primary INS is still standard - as in, all the navigation is driven primarily from INS system outputs.

But, as it always was, it is regularly corrected with GNSS or navaid corrections. As far as I know most airliners still don't automatically enter corrections for INS and require manual input (basically retyping of GNSS data from a screen into a keypad) to put human into the loop which can verify if GNSS is being spoofed. The pilots can alternatively do the correction using VOR/DME navaids or even their eyes if they feel like it.

As far as I know, it's becoming much more common to have INS with ability to automatically correct drift from GNSS in smaller planes (and I'm sure that will make it to airliners sooner than later).

[MadnessASAP]

You're both right, the aircraft position as reported to aircrew, displayed on maps, and fed to the flight director (the autopilots outermost loop) is a blended INS/GPS solution. The opensource drone projects Ardupilot and PX4 have a lot of info and implementations of this actually.

However the autopilots inner loop and Flight Direction Indicator (artificial horizon) are going to be driven almost entirely by INS. This is because GPS positions can't update fast enough, are noisy, and don't provide velocity, acceleration, or orientation (outside of even slower position integration). Also those systems are not particularly involved in where the aircraft is, rather they care about where it is going.

I haven't looked into what the requirements of ADSB position information is, I don't suspect that they mandate GNSS but they may mandate a degree of accuracy. From an ATC perspective within crowded airspaces ADSB would be augmented by primary surveillance radar to prevent mishaps, spoofing, and errors.

For what it's worth my day job is aircraft avionics, navigation equipment is pretty much daily for me.

Ps. Hi HN, Reddit refugee and my first post here.

[dramm]

To be clear GPS does provides high-quality Doppler derived velocity. It's a fundamental output of all GNSS systems, separate from the positional data and certainly not provided by differencing positional data.

---

I suspect much or all of the data boradcast is GPS derived. Would be nice to have some hard data there.

For almost all general aviation aircraft in the USA the data source for ADS-B Out is GPS. All the GA STCs I've seen are GPS only position sources. Many modern GA aircraft will have AHRS but not a full INS, and so INS is not an option for them. Even on larger business jets that may have INS with GPS integration I am not clear any actually use it to drive ADS-B Out, the few installations I've looked at were all GPS.

Boeing was an early advocate for GNSS alone driving ADS-B Out. I think their argument was simplicity, everybody has the same data, and not dependent on erroneous INS or INS settings. I'm not sure what they ended up doing with all their actual installations. If the intent is to send more exotic data such as roll-angle they'll need some INS or at least AHRS integration, but there is no requirement to broadcast that data. The few early third party STCs I saw for ADS-B Out installations in Boeing aircraft only used GPS data sources.

[lxgr]

To my understanding, most aircraft use a combination of INS and GPS for both redundancy and spoofing resilience.

This actually makes spoofing attacks very difficult, since you'd need to target each receiver individually and in a very precise way (e.g. a reasonably filtered system would reject a GPS signal indicating that the plane just by a couple of kilometers and changed direction by 90 degrees without any measurable acceleration).

[exitb]

It should be easy to correct for - only count aircraft that actually report good navigation accuracy sometimes.

[jjwiseman]

It only counts aircraft as experiencing interference if they have previously reported high navigation accuracy on their flight, and then begin reporting low accuracy. It's not going to just show places where INS drifts. However, it may show areas, typically military, where aerobatics or hard maneuvering are taking place, which can mask an aircraft's GPS antennae from the satellites.

[greggsy]

That would explains why Ukraine went from mostly green around 20 February 2022, to ‘no data’ several days later.