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by MereInterest 982 days ago
This is known as a "reductio ad absurdum" argument, and isn't contrived at all. It's easy to make a general rule that applies in the majority of cases. To test whether a general rule has flaws, and to improve upon a general rule, it must be tested by applying it to edge cases. The same way that you test a datetime library by picking potential edge cases (e.g. Leap Day, dates before 1970, dates between Feb. 1-13 in 1918 in Russia, etc), you test a philosophical theory by seeing what it predicts in potential edge cases.

This also deliberately avoids introducing irrelevant arguments. By framing it as a mugger who wants to gain money for purely selfish reasons, we deliberately exclude complicating factors from the statement.

* The argument could be framed around donating to the Susan G. Komen Foundation, rather than a mugger. With the controversies it has had [0], it could be argued that these donations may or may not increase total utility, but donations to charities are part of the best possible path. However, using the Susan G. Komen Foundation as an example relies on accepting a premise that it isn't using donations appropriately, and makes the argument dependent on whether that is or isn't the case.

* The argument could be framed around allowing tax exemptions for all self-described charitable foundations, with Stichting INGKA Foundation [1], part of the corporate structure that owns IKEA, playing the narrative role of the mugger. The argument would be that the tax exemptions provided to charitable foundations are necessary for bringing about the best outcomes, but that they can be taken advantage of. Here, the argument would depend on whether you view the corporate structure of INGKA as a legitimate charity.

* Even staying with purely hypothetical answers, we could ask if the mugger going to starve should be mugging be unsuccessful. These could veer into questions of the local economy, food production, and so on, none of which help to test the validity of utilitarianism.

I've heard this described as crafting the least convenient world. That is, whenever there's a question about the hypothetical scenario that would let you avoid an edge case in a theory, update the hypothetical scenario to be the least convenient option. What if the mugger just needs a hug? Nope, too convenient. What if the mugger isn't going to go through with the finger-chopping? Nope, too convenient.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Susan_G._Komen_for_the_Cure#Co...

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stichting_INGKA_Foundation

2 comments

The problem here is that the counterargument is contrived to the point where it is stupid. This article isn't identifying a problem in theory or practice.

In theory a utilitarian is likely comfortable with the in-principle idea that they might need to sacrifice themselves for a greater good. Pointing that out isn't a counterargument against utilitarianism. In practice, no utilitarian would fall for something this dumb. They'd just keep the money and assume (correctly in my view) they missed something in the argument that invalidates the mugger's position. Or, likely, assume the mugger is lying about being an insane deontologist.

> In practice, no utilitarian would fall for something this dumb.

This is the penultimate conclusion of the dialogue as well, that even Bentham would need to admit so many post-hoc deviations from the general rules of Utilitarianism that it ends up being a form of deontology instead. The primary takeaway is then that Utilitarianism works as a rule-of-thumb, but not as an underlying fundamental truth.

No it isn't, the dialog is strawmaning and claims that Bentham would have to abandon utilitarianism.

I'm claiming that the initial scenario where Bentham caves is reasonable, but in practice will never occur. A utilitarian could reasonably believe Bentham's response was correct (I mean, seriously, would you look at someone and refuse to spend $10 to save their finger? You'd be a monster. As the article points out, we're talking literally 1 person). There is no theoretical problem in that scenario. Bentham has maximised utility based on the scenario presented. It was a scenario designed where the clear-cut utility maximisation choice was to sacrifice $10.

The issue is this scenario is an insane hypothetical that cannot occur in practice. There are no deontologists that strict and there are no choices that binary. So we can conclude in alternate universes that we do not inhabit utilitarianism would not work because these muggers would end up with all the money. Alright. Case closed. Not a practical problem. The first act plays out then the article should end with the conclusion concludes "if that could happen then utilitarianism would have a problem. But it can't so oh well. Turns out utilitarianism is a philosophy that works out really equitably in this universe!"

> In practice, no utilitarian would fall for something this dumb.

What you are saying is exactly what the article says, and you are conceding the article's point, which is that nobody actually practices pure utilitarianism.

Do we want to talk about a hypothetical world where deontology was the underlying moral principle? Where, for example, a large agency in charge of approving vaccines decided to delay approval of a life saving because, even though they received the information on November 20th, they scheduled the meeting for December 10-12th dammit, and that's when it'll be done? By potentially delaying several months because, instead of using challenge trials to directly assess the safety of a vaccine by exposing willing volunteers to both the supposed cure and disease, instead gave the cure to a couple of tens of thousands of people, and just waited until enough of them got sick and died to a disease "that would have got them anyway" to gather enough statistics for safety? Which is definitely good, you see, because no one got directly harmed by said agency, even if many more people in the country were dying of this theoretical disease. [0]

Or, even better, what if distribution of this life saving cure was done based on the deontological concept of fairness? Surely, this wouldn't result in limited and highly demanded vaccines being literally thrown away[1] in the name of equity and where vaccination companies wouldn't need to seek approval for something as simple as increasing doses of vaccines in vials. [2]

You know, just all theoretically, since it would be a terrible shame if any of these things happened in the real world, since this is just one specific scenario and I'm sure I can make up various [3] other [4] ways [5] in which not carefully evaluating the consequences of moral actions would turn out poorly, but hey!

I'm sure glad that utilitarianism isn't being entertained more on the margin, since we already live in the best of all possible moral universes.

(Footnote, I'm not going to justify these citations within this post, because it's pithier this way. I recognize this is not being fully honest and transparent, but I'd be happy to fully defend the inclusion of any these, if necessary)

[0] https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/wr/mm7014e1.htm

[1] https://worksinprogress.co/issue/the-story-of-vaccinateca ctrl f "On being legally forbidden to administer lifesaving healthcare"

[2] https://www.businessinsider.com/moderna-asks-fda-approve-mor...

[3] https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2010/07/01/the-playpump-wh...

[4] https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2641547

[5] https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=983649