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by sebzim4500 991 days ago
Interesting. I don't understand the revocation process though.

What stops the blu-ray reader from just ignoring the revocation list on the disk?

3 comments

The revocation list is for the TV. Intel revokes a TV's key, distributes the updated revocation list on new Blu-ray discs, and when a compliant Blu-ray player is playing one of those new discs it will refuse to negotiate with a revoked TV.

Now that I think of it, I wonder if compliant Blu-ray players actually save the new revocation entries and then continue refusing to negotiate with revoked TVs even for old Blu-ray discs.

If so, couldn't a malicious disc revoke all TVs?
Perhaps, although you’d presumably need Intel’s private keys in order to sign the revocation list.
That's where the reversing comes in to switch the function call to check the revocation list to a NOP and just keep on going. At least, that's how I imagine HDMI equipment that ignores HDCP works

What stops them from being sold that way would probably be the licensing agreement and honest players. I'd imagine in China, there are lots of these types of devices available.

the blu-ray is encrypted and the player requires a key to decrypt it

if you want your blu-ray player to be able to read blu-ray disks you sign a contract that says you will respect the revocation list

if you change your mind later: your player key will be revoked and new blu-rays won't play on your device

(it's actually more sophisticated than this... they can block specific players too)

That doesn't quite sound right to me. I don't think a new Blu-ray disc could be released that continues to be readable by some old readers but is no longer readable by other old readers.
> I don't think a new Blu-ray disc could be released that continues to be readable by some old readers but is no longer readable by other old readers.

you can obviously think whatever you want, but you'd be completely wrong

DVD supported this 20 years ago, blu-ray's system is far more sophisticated and can even block individual players

    The approach of AACS provisions each individual player with a unique set of decryption keys which are used in a broadcast encryption scheme. This approach allows licensors to "revoke" individual players, or more specifically, the decryption keys associated with the player. Thus, if a given player's keys are compromised and published, the AACS LA can simply revoke those keys in future content, making the keys/player useless for decrypting new titles.
(from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Access_Content_System)

the spec also supports a persistent CRL so a new disk can also stop your old disks from working

The problem, of course, being that some players will just read the raw bytes from the disc without even attempting to decrypt them, and then anyone can decrypt them in software using any other keys even if the player used to read the disc was revoked.

Then every time another player's keys are published it allows anyone to use the older player to read discs using the newer player's leaked keys. And some players are cracked but the keys aren't published, instead they use them to extract the disc key for every new disc and then publish all the disc keys, which can be used in the same way without revealing which player was cracked.

For CSS and AACS, yes. I was referring specifically to HDCP, which involves negotiation between source and sink devices and AFAIK has nothing like broadcast encryption.