| None of which will change those three points practically. For any bit of information, they may not apply, but if you assume they’re true you’ll: 1) not record information that is truly damaging in a damaging way (which is really good practice in general if you’ve got something to lose!) 2) have practical operational practices which do not rely on these being false - which is a really good idea if that actually matters (you have actual enemies somewhere). 3) you’ll focus on safety and building value in areas which are not mere information at rest, which is a good modern practice. Osama Bin Laden already knew all this, which is why it took so long to find him. A decade or so. I guarantee you the CIA has been learning this with all their leaks. The FBI learned this this after COINTELPRO. What is not written down can’t show up as a grainy photocopy in the New York Times, or a viral video from Wikileaks, or whatever. What you’re talking about is a hammer to use to punish someone after a leak. But by then it’s far too late for anything actually valuable. Necessary and important for ‘day to day’ stuff like bank account balances I guess, as long as you assume that they’ll be violated with little practical recourse if you have anything actually valuable in it. Streisand effect, etc. |
As far as companies are concerned, personal information should be considered hazardous material, and avoided at all costs.