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Not enough downvotes for this. I'm assuming this is all BS considering you got all the details wrong. It was the CEO who got a $3 million bonus in 2016, not the CIO. Susan Mauldin, who earned a music degree in college, was the Equifax CISO, not their CIO. The reason I'm so salty about your response is when the breach happened, there were tons of news reports denigrating the CISO because she had a music degree. There may be a ton of reasons she wasn't good at her job (though it's hard to say as CISO is often a "sacrificial lamb" job anyway), and I'm certainly not defending Equifax, but I take major issue with the implication that a music degree makes someone unqualified for a tech job. First, as she was CISO, she was presumably done with college many, many years ago. Lots of people have college degrees that aren't necessarily directed to the career they end up in. More importantly, though, I've found that there is a direct correlation between highly trained musicians and great software engineers. I don't know if it's a "same part of the brain" thing or whatever, but I'm actually astounded at the sheer number of "best of the best" software engineers I've worked with that are classically trained musicians. It's to the point that when hiring I give "extra points" if you will to musicians because, it my experience at least, the correlation is so strong. So, frankly, you can take your "she had a music degree" shade and shove it. |
The music degree scrutiny is unnecessarily derogatory and borderline misogynistic. She was a fine executive and predictably the first one thrown under the bus. I can't say she revolutionized anything, but I had no complaints about her competence. (By comparison, the male C-levels in the company I currently work under have relevant degrees from impressive institutions. I see them watching porn, engaging in insider trading and doing God knows what on Tor...while our latest two product launches failed.)
Equifax's fate was sealed by the CEO himself. We had highly-competent security teams that kept up with CVEs, ran CABs, everything a "secure" org should do...but there was always a top-down culture of "I'm not saying don't patch systems, but don't impact production" at every level. This sort of event was inevitable under Smith's leadership.