[Nevermark]

No that isn't accurate.

You have a network of VPN point providers. As you communicate, data can be sent through any series of points.

Data is encrypted end-to-end, and the addresses for the point providers are also encrypted so that each point can only decrypt and see the next point to forward data to.

So each point knows where data last came from, and where they are sending it. But they don't know:

1. Which step of a chain of points the data is at.

2. If they are the first in the chain (i.e. the "from" is the source)

3. If they are the last in the chain (i.e. the "to" is the destination)

And (as long as two or more points are traversed, which would be always), no point ever has access to:

4. Both source and destination info.

Finally, since payments to each point are handled through a combination of peer-to-peer point bookkeeping, and a crypto block chain account, no point ever knows:

5. Any identity information about who uses the VPN.

6. Any way to identify activity over time that is related.

Acting as a point, as well as using the network, serves to further cloak activity, as being from you vs. passed through you.

And an alternative to crypto payments, would be earning usage by providing point service.

EDIT:

> so I searched and found https://surfshark.com/[...]

Any VPN provider that is claiming decentralized VPNs are a greater risk is either misinformed, or willing to misinform users.

I wouldn't trust a VPN provider from either category.

Actual reasons to not use a dVPN might be that it is a work in progress, not supported well, its source code is not open, or not yet vetted by experts, too slow, not many points yet, etc.

[tredre3]

Aren't you just describing Tor?

[mainpassathome]

yes but it has le heckin crypto

[Nevermark]

Hmm. You left out the most important bit!

Some kind of economics are needed to over come the fact that there are only a few thousand Tor nodes [0], making it relatively easy to compromise the network by any entity willing to pay for a couple of thousand nodes [1], which is a bargain for any intelligence service.

I.e. Tor is pretty safe, but because it’s volunteer, it is also a bit of a honeypot.

Now take all the money people spend on commercial VPN’s, and anonymize accounts while making some privacy first crypto actually useful to the general public.

Millions of nodes, or tens of millions.

The benefits come not just from linear node path anonymity.

By spreading traffic packets in parallel across different paths, and geographically, so it’s near impossible to track anything useful even with a lot of compromised nodes.

Assuming you have a LOT of nodes.

(Geography here meaning Internet topology, verified by minimal latency.

Topological information for millions of nodes will help keep latency low, while increasing the number of nodes in each path, for a better security vs. latency trade off.

So nodes could be incentivized to locate and scale based on topology & usage.)

If there is a way to make Tor anywhere near that secure a lot of people would like to know how.

Economics matter, and this money is being spent already.

[0] https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html

[1] https://www.makeuseof.com/tor-exit-nodes-spying/#:~:text=A%2....