Libya had a nuclear weapons programme, and actively pursued development or acquisition of nuclear weapons from the 1970s until 2003 when all such work ceased.
But it never actually had nuclear weapons to the best of my knowledge.
You're right, I was wrong. I remember now that they had existent chemical weapons and a nuclear weapons program. Over time, my memory of talk of them "giving up their WMD" led to conflation and "giving up their nukes".
I think it's an important and interesting corrective, but fundamentally doesn't affect my argument about the intervention in Libya and its effects. It's just less ironic now.
That's been rare in this and a few related threads. I hope others might follow your lead.
I'd also like to point out that the situation is complicated, long-standing, has antecedents which trace back centuries, and has and is viewed as a chessboard for proxy battles by numerous foreign interests, as well as its own internal divisions.
And that some seem hell-bent on fighting ideological battles over a situation where 20,000 souls may well have been lost, which somewhat disappoints me.
Yes, I don't like meta-commentary (i.e., talking about other comments on HN without actually directly responding to them), but I have been angered to see so many "might is right", "we only destroyed them because they were so weak" comments in response to people noting any potential for responsibility beyond local mismanagement.
That said: failed polities tend to result in failing infrastructures, increased stresses and strains (climate, economy, demographics, geopolitics, etc.) tend to interfere with effective polity, and as I've repeatedly pointed out in my comments to this thread, even in reasonably well-goverened and functioning societies, failures and close calls are disturbingly common.
The NY Times followed up with an article asking where else dams are at high risk. One point not raised in that article is what precautions can be taken, something I'd strongly encourage.
Even where a specific government is grossly incapable, both individuals and outside agencies in fact can anticipate and take steps to greatly reduce risks and harms from dam failures.
For starters, unlike numerous other mega-catastrophies, dams rarely fail utterly unexpectedly, both in the long term (problematic dams are problematic, often for decades, as here), or in the short term (severe weather events and dangerous geology and geography serve as triggers and amplifiers of risks).
Virtually all the risk comes in the initial flash flood and deluge itself. This risk is virtually completely mitigated by getting out of the way of and above the height of the flood. Knowing safe ground and/or creating evacuation facilities (strong construction, high walls, and out of the immediate water path) are both mitigations which are reasonably easily undertaken. Yes, vast areas may see property damage, but death, injury, and disease can be avoided.
Weather forecasting can predict dangerous storms often with up to a week's warning, and generally several days even where forecasting models perform poorly. Hours of advance notice can serve well. Radio and broadcast media remain effective for reaching large populations at low cost. Where local authorities fail to take these measures, foreign organisations, from broadcasters (BBC, VOA, DW, and commercial operators) to relief organisations (International Red Cross/Red Crescent) can both warn of and anticipate emergencies, warming up and pre-staging rescue and relief operations.
The second most vulnerable period is after the flood where people remain in damaged regions without infrastructure, most especially clean fresh water, sewerage capabilities, food, and medical care.
Note that unlike mass storms such as hurricanes, floods need not see wide-area evacuations. Rather than an entire county, state, or province, it's typically limited small settlements or specific neighbourhoods of larger cities which are most at-risk and which require evacuation. Moving only a few hundred metres may well be sufficient, or perhaps a few kilometres where a large flood-plain exists. Even in regions where transportation capabilities are limited, this is almost always possible.
The remaining issues are long-term recovery, rebuilding, and yes, tackling problematic dams and removing those which cannot be rehabilitated or have past any useful function.
I think it's an important and interesting corrective, but fundamentally doesn't affect my argument about the intervention in Libya and its effects. It's just less ironic now.