[dvdhsu]

Hi, David, founder @ Retool here. We are currently working with law enforcement, and we believe they have corroborating evidence through audio that suggests a deepfake is likely. (Put another way, law enforcement has more evidence than just the employee's testimony.)

(I wish we could blog about this one day... maybe in a few decades, hah. Learning more about the government's surveillance capabilities has been interesting.)

I agree with you on hardware 2FA tokens. We've since ordered them and will start mandating them. The purpose of this blog post is to communicate that what is traditionally considered 2FA isn't actually 2FA if you follow the default Google flow. We're certainly not making any claims that "we are the world's most secure company"; we are just making the claim that "what appears to be MFA isn't always MFA".

(I may have to delete this comment in a bit...)

[hnburnsy]

Thanks for all this insight, this is why HN rules. What is your impression of law enforcement, everyone claims to reach out after an attack, but I've never seen follow up of sucessful law enforcement activity resulting in arrests or prosecution. Thanks again.

[dvdhsu]

(May also have to delete this later, but...)

Law enforcement is currently attempting to ascertain whether or not the actor is within the US. If it's within the US, I (personally) believe there's a good chance they'll take the case on and presumably with enough digging, will find the attacker. (The people involved seem to be... pretty good.)

But if they're outside US (which is actually reasonably high probability, given the brazenness of the attack, and the fact that they're leaving a lot of exhaust [e.g. IP address, phone number, browser fingerprints, etc.]), then my understanding is that law enforcement is far less interested, since it's unlikely that even an identification of the hacker would lead to any concrete results (e.g. if they were in North Korea). (FWIW, the attack was not conducted via Tor, which to me implies that the actor isn't too worried about law enforcement.)

To give you a sense, we are in an active dialogue with "professionals". This isn't a "report this to your local police station" kind of situation.

[e12e]

On the plus side, if the attacker is outside the US, and a foreign national - the NSAs illegal wiretap evidence is legal!

[remram]

The collection is legal as far as the NSA's mandate, but whether it's admissible in court...

[ianhawes]

FWIW engaging simultaneously with both the FBI and the USAO/DOJ and putting pressure on DOJ to act on the case typically results in better outcomes than just assuming the SA assigned is going to follow through and bugging them about it.

[hnburnsy]

Thx again!

[oldtownroad]

> …we believe they have corroborating evidence through audio that suggests a deepfake is likely…

Does that mean they have audio of the call?

[ianhawes]

Most attacks like this use stolen credentials for VOIP providers, i.e. Twilio. It's likely the FBI quickly obtained a subpoena which produced a recording. The attacker may not have known the call was being recorded.

[apostacy]

This is an example of Google sabotaging a techology it doesn't like. I'm not saying it is a conspiracy. But by thwarting TOTP like this, Google is benefiting.

I really like TOTP. It gives me more flexibility to control keys on my end. And you can still use a Yubikey to secure your private TOTP key. But you can also choose to copy your private key to multiple hardware tokens without needing anyone's permission. Properly used, you can get most of the benefit of FIDO2 with a lot more flexibility.

I actually recently deployed TOTP, and everyone was quite happy with it. But knowing that Google is syncing private keys around by default, I no longer think we can trust it.

[alsodumb]

Thanks for the reply! What's expecting one.

Since you might have you delete the reply anyway, can I get a candid answer on why hardware 2FA tokens weren't a part of the default workflow before the incident? Was it concerns about the cost, the recovery modes, or was it just the trust in the existing approach?