[dirtyid]

>Myanmar

Pretty much all negative coverage of JF17 (joint PRC+PK manufacturing but so far SOLD by PK) are sourced from Indian tabloid rags with no credibility. Myanmar airforce has 100+ PRC airframes, variety of models in the last 30 years with little issue. Pretty much the only useful piece of info so far is Myanmar doesn't have adequate experience operating tech in 4th gen fighters, most of their fleet is 3rd gen. IIRC Myanmar got the jets before they even got simluators, and then bought 4th gen trainers (JL9) from PRC.

>Thailand

Yuan subs aren't operational because PRC couldn't acquire original specified German engines after EU sanctions. There's a period where Thai Navy was deciding whether to accept PRC engines, which they did. Some analysts implied if Thai did not accept PRC engines it would imply they were unsuitable, even more retarded media then spung that as technical issues with PRC engines. Both complete misinformation narratives since there's no basis for evaluating those unintegrated PRC engines at all.

>aircraft carriers

Training carriers based off RU design that analysis suggest PLAN has more or less maximized sortie potential vs when USSR was running carrier ops on similar flight deck. Late 2022 USNI analysis on PLAN carrier ops is they're basically reached "true" blue water deployment, i.e. a few hundred nms near Guam, 1000nm+ from mainland, with no divert airfrields or aerial refueling as backup. Which is about as far as PRC none nuke carriers need to deploy given strategic considerations. Caveate being conservative sorties and pretty clean (light) load outs to compensate for lack of divertion and ski jump. The struggle with PLAN carriers is they won't have catapults and capabilites that brings until 003 and training was hectic because they only had 1-2 carriers training 3-4 crew rotations, somewhat alleviated by converted cruise/barrack ships. TLDR is I would not characterize as overall carrier ops capabilities as struggling as limited by hardware, which TBH is expected since carriers does not seem particularly high priority outside of prestige - given PRC ship building capacity, they could have rushed 10 carriers like US did Forrestal class. Basically most US analysis of various PRC military modernization is they're lacking and focusing on XYZ, but should get there in a few years. Occasionally throw in the word struggle because they watch CCTV7 where miltiary propaganda talks about how hard they work. A few years later, new analysis that they got there (i.e. asw, jointness), something something evolving, modernizing at astonishing rate, but here's the new struggle. Rinse and repeat. Combined with customary but no real combat experience (which no one has in modern peer warfare). But the underlying pattern if you look at meat of improvements year by year is PLA modernizing fast.

[themadturk]

I wonder if PRC really sees using a navy as a means of force projection as important. They could have a world-spanning navy like the U.S. has, but haven't made it a priority. No one has done it as well for as long as the U.S., but it's also something that could be erased in a few minutes by some well-placed Long Swords.

[dirtyid]

Navy + carrier good for peacetime "diplomacy" via show of force / presence. Hence worth pursuing in some capacity. But ultimately PRC can't have world spanning navy because geopolitical conditions to replicate US global basing not present anymore - would take status quo / order changing conflict. And it would still take decades to train for 10+ carrier groups for parity. Therefore (IMO) PRC doubling down on long range (even global) fires, advanced rocketry that can be acquired and deployed at scale, in relatively short time, to destroy prestige platform from PRC mainland basing, without complex forward deployment or doctorine considerations. Basically make sure you have more missiles and ISR with sufficient CEP than enemies can defend/degrade. Hit aircraft carriers, subs, when they're in port, or the 10 fast combat support ships that sustains most of USN critical deployement options. For as large USN is, the system that sustains fleet is extremely brittle (same with PLAN) - carrier escorts have days of endurance on aggressive tasking. Would take PRC rocketry _minutes_ to take out replenishment ship restocking at port and carriers become single deployment assets. This kind of capability was not technically feasible 10-20 years ago - none of US adversaries could disrupt USN logistics. But now is.

IMO US pretty much understands this as well, for as much reporting there is on dysfunction of navy and urgent need to fix, there hasn't been much actions instead we see doubling down on distributed land based fires and increasing aviation standoff range, and ultimately long range bombers strait from CONUS to reduce basing dependencies abroad.

[themadturk]

I think you've got a point on strategy and standoff weapons, but I'd question whether anyone thinks a strike on support craft (or even combat vessels) while they're sitting in either U.S. or allied ports isn't an even more serious provocation than hitting our ships at sea. A forward deployed carrier strike group has, as you say, supplies for several days (at least) of unsupported operations, and (as long as the carriers aren't sunk) could carry an impressive punch during that time. I don't know how PLAN anti-submarine capabilities are, but fast attack submarines can carry a heavy conventional punch via cruise missiles. I think it's possible attacks on American soil could result in similar retaliation on enemy soil, such as direct strikes on Chinese naval bases and even political targets.

[dirtyid]

PRC already assumes mainland strikes, and TBH this has been default assumption for any US adversaries because US has projection capabilities and therefore homeland attacks must be accounted for. US warplanners and politicians haven't been shy about talking up striking PRC mainland, whether they seriously believe so, or whether it's all security theatre to create security delimma for PRC. Never the less, it's baked into the consideration for PRC - what hasn't been considered by US planners and populus are substantial CONUS attacks, because up until now geography has shielded US, but long range strikes / advanced rocketry makes it possible, and adversaries will match escalation when they can. It's only up until recently, US adversaries technically couldn't strike CONUS even if they wanted to, barring desperate propaganda measures like fugo balloons. And it makes escalatory sense since so much of US power/influence depends on CONUS serenity. A world where CONUS is vunerable is a world where others forced to "derisk" from US and reevaluate viability of US security commitment.

As for allied ports and rear support, US basing that enables operations against PRC in theatre, which basically US force structure requires at this point (hence all the wargames trying to convince JP to distributed basing), is IMO even more forgone. Various US partners signalled they wouldn't directly contribute to TW war but will provide rear support, but that's enabling US war regardless, so very likely they're going to get glassed. PRC systems confrontation and system destruction warfare is structured around destroying the softer/easier targets like support ships, tankers, ISR infra etc. Hitting them is doctrine. And ultimately, it's in PRC's long term interest to destroy as much US forward presence as possible, because that's historically how outside hegemons get kicked out, through sufficient force to demonstrate their strategic posture is no longer viable. And US having decades of build up abroad has more dependencies and more to lose if their security architecture becomes unsustainable.

As for unsupported carrier operations, IMO if you consider the sorties numbers their effects are close to negligible. Boat might be nuke powered, but there's only enough supplies (fuel/ordnance) for low hundreds of sorties, 50%+ of which will be buddy tanking / support due to how far PRC A2D2 has pushed standoff range, which leaves a even lower 100s of actual hitters. Assuming no interceptions. Barely enough to dent the 100,000s of targets from mainland. It's not that US CVGs are weak, just PRC operates on another scale, more targets, more concrete, more counter measures etc. Without constant replenishment carriers become single deployment assets with limited use and cost:vunerablity ratio not in their favour. And even then nuke propulsion need to return to dock, where they can be promptly hit with global strike.